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ABSTRACT
Seafood substitution, the intentional or negligent mislabeling of fish and seafood, is
estimated to cost American consumers over $25 billion per year. According to some studies,
more than a third of the five billion pounds of seafood consumed in the United States is
mislabeled when sold. Despite being virtually omnipresent throughout every level the US food
supply chain, seafood substitution is rarely prosecuted due to a woeful mismatch between the
scale of the problem and the resources dedicated to enforcement. This comment explores the
pervasiveness of the fish fraud problem and the inadequacies of the current response before
developing a “crowd-sourced” enforcement model to realign the economics of the seafood
industry in order to reduce or eliminate consumer-facing seafood substation.

KEY TERMS
Seafood Substitution, Fish Fraud, Seafood Mislabeling, Food Inspection, Seafood Regulation,
Consumer-Facing Fraud, Qui Tam Scheme, Economic Deterrence.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Each year, nearly five billion pounds of seafood is consumed within the United States,
equating to roughly fifteen pounds per capita, generating trillions in revenue across the supply
chain and impacting the livelihood of fisherman, importers, wholesalers, retailers, processors and
restaurants.1 Lurking beneath the ocean’s remarkable bounty is a potentially costly and
dangerous truth – more than a third of seafood and seafood products sold may be mislabeled,
either through innocent confusion or blatant fraud.2 This mislabeling, commonly called seafood
substitution, takes many forms – during importation when Asian catfish (swai) is labeled as
grouper to avoid anti-dumping tariffs, at the wholesaler where frozen Pacific cod is sold as
freshly caught local Atlantic cod to meet local demand, in the grocery store where farmed
Atlantic salmon is labeled as higher-value wild-caught Coho, or on a sushi menu where the
gastrointestinal distress inducing escolar is rechristened as “white tuna.”3 Seafood substitution is
estimated to cost the American consumer over twenty-five billion dollars each year.4
Despite being virtually omnipresent throughout every level the US food supply chain,
seafood substitution is rarely prosecuted due to a woeful mismatch between the scale of the
problem and the resources dedicated to enforcement. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (“NOAA”), which has the primary responsibility of enforcing the seafood
1

Nearly Half of U.S. Seafood Wasted, THE MARITIME EXECUTIVE (Jan. 1, 2017), http://maritimeexecutive.com/article/nearly-half-of-us-seafood-wasted; Basic Questions about Aquaculture,
NOAA FISHERIES, http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/aquaculture/faqs/faq_aq_101.html#4howmuch
(last visited Jan. 1, 2017).
2Kimberly Warner, Walker Timme, Beth Lowell & Michael Hirshfield, Oceana Study Reveals
Seafood Fraud Nationwide, OCEANA.ORG at 1, 10, 61, 63 (2013),
http://oceana.org/sites/default/files/reports/National_Seafood_Fraud_Testing_Results_FINAL.pd
f [hereinafter OCEANA Study 2013] (21 states had mislabeled seafood using 1,215 samples
from a variety of retail establishments. There was a wide variation of seafood mislabeling among
the cities tested: 21% in Portland, 35% in Kansas City, 39% in New York, 18% in Boston, 26%
in Washington DC, 38% in South Florida, 36% in Denver, 25% in Atlanta, 56% in Pittsburgh,
32% in Chicago, 49% in Austin/Houston, 38% in Northern California, 18% in Seattle, 52% in
Southern California and 33% nationwide.).
3 Nicole Lou, Bait and Switch: The Fraud Crisis In the Seafood Industry, THE ATLANTIC (Mar.
19, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/03/bait-and-switch/388126/
[hereinafter Lou, Bait and Switch]; Nicole Danna, That “Grouper” is Really Mackerel: Seafood
Fraud Rampant in Florida, NEW TIMES BROWARD PALM BEACH, July 24, 2012,
http://www.browardpalmbeach.com/restaurants/that-grouper-is-really-mackerel-seafood-fraudrampant-in-florida-6389152; Jenn Abelson & Beth Daley, On the Menu, but not on your Plate,
THE BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 23, 2011,
http://www.bostonglobe.com/2011/10/22/dnatest/NDbXGXdPR6O37mXRSVPGlL/story.html
[hereinafter Abelson & Daley, On the Menu]; Beth Daley & Jenn Abelson, Fish Supply Chain
Open to Abuses, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 24, 2011,
https://www.bostonglobe.com/2011/10/23/suppliersart/ASVzh9iDn1rTNuMbS2beFO/story.html [hereinafter Daley & Abelson, Fish Supply Chain
Open to Abuse].
4 Lou, Bait and Switch, supra note 3.
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mislabeling provisions of the Lacey Act 5 has less than one hundred fisheries investigators on
staff.6 Meanwhile, the Food & Drug Administration (“FDA”), which holds enforcement
authority under the Food & Drug Act, inspects less than two-percent of imported seafood and
fails to address economic fraud in any meaningful way.7 With such limited resources available,
Federal enforcement tends to focus on only the largest scale of fish fraud, targeting multi-million
dollar import and origin labeling frauds, particularly those where foreign caught seafood is
relabeled as US caught or promoted as being from a distinctive US fishery.8
While possibly justifiable given the lack of resources, these enforcement priorities fail to
address the vast majority of seafood substitutions, especially at the retail and food service levels,
leaving consumers across the country exposed to fraudulent fish.9 However, in response to
growing awareness among consumers and industry watchdog groups, the Presidential Task Force
on Combating Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing and Seafood Fraud released a
number of broad recommendations aimed at combating seafood substitution through enhanced
cooperation and information sharing between enforcement agencies, expanded regulation of
seafood marketing by providing clear guidance on acceptable names and labels for marketing,10
16 U.S.C. § 3372(d) (2016) (“It is unlawful for any person to make or submit any false record,
account, or label for, or any false identification of any fish, wildlife, or plant which has been, or
is intended to be (1) imported, exported, transported, sold, purchased, or received from any
foreign country; or (2) transported in interstate or foreign commerce.”); see also, Fraud,
FISHWATCH U.S. SEAFOOD FACTS, http://www.fishwatch.gov/eating-seafood/fraud (last visited
Jan. 1, 2017) [hereinafter Fraud, FISHWATCH U.S. SEAFOOD FACTS].
6 Catherine Rentz, Seafood Fraud Cases Plummet as NOAA Cuts Investigators, THE PORTLAND
PRESS HERALD, Dec. 11, 2014, http://www.pressherald.com/2014/12/11/seafood-fraud-casesplummet-as-noaa-cuts-investigators/.
7
Lou, Bait and Switch, supra note 3; U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO
THE RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OCEANS, ATMOSPHERE, F ISHERIES, AND COAST
GUARD, COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, U.S. SENATE: SEAFOOD
FRAUD, 5-6 (2009), http://www.gao.gov/assets/290/287425.pdf [hereinafter GAO SEAFOOD
FRAUD].
8 E.g., Peter Dujardin & Tamara Dietrich, Feds Investigating Casey’s Seafood on Mixing Atlantic
Blue Crab with Imports, DAILY PRESS (June 25, 2015),
http://www.dailypress.com/news/crime/dp-nws-federal-charges-peninsula-20150627-story.html;
Office of Public Affairs, North Carolina Seafood Processor and Distributor Sentenced for
Mislabeling Shrimp, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (Aug. 11, 2015),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/north-carolina-seafood-processor-and-distributor-sentencedmislabeling-shrimp; Texas Company Sentenced for Passing Off Mexican Shrimp As U.S. Caught,
NOAA FISHERIES (Sep. 24, 2015),
http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/ole/newsroom/stories/15/24_texas_company_sentenced_for_passing_
_off_mexican_shrimp_as_u.s.-caught.html.
9 OCEANA Study 2013, supra note 2, at 1-2.
10 See generally The Seafood List - FDA's Guide to Acceptable Market Names for Seafood Sold
in Interstate Commerce, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION,
http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/GuidanceDocumentsRegulatoryInformation/Seaf
ood/ucm113260.htm (last visited Jan. 3, 2017) [hereinafter FDA Seafood List] (“This guidance
is intended to provide guidance to industry about what FDA considers to be acceptable market
5
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and plans to establish a comprehensive international origin and processing traceability
program.11 Unfortunately, in the current US political climate, proposals that require legislative
approval for additional resources or regulatory controls are, at best, unlikely to proceed.
Faced with a permanent and terminal disconnect between the resources allocated to
enforcement and the scale of the seafood substitution problem there is an opportunity to augment
traditional command and control regulation with creative solutions that leverage potential
liability to induce change. This comment will propose the construction of a post-regulatory
enforcement regime targeting consumer-facing seafood fraud, primarily built from tested legal
innovations used in other areas of the law, such as civil rights litigation, strict liability statutes,
and tax enforcement. The goal is to create a statutory mechanism that: (1) crowd sources
inspection to the local consumer or consumer group; (2) organizes cases into an efficient scale
for discovery and adjudication; (3) differentiates bad actors from the merely sloppy or easily
bamboozled; and (4) imposes a severe enough penalty such that it aligns the economics of the
industry in order to minimize mislabeling throughout the supply chain.
This comment will begin in Section II by analyzing the scope of the problem, the current
state of the laws and the inadequacy of resources dedicated to addressing seafood substitution.
The comment will then review the motivators of seafood substitution as well as recent
enforcement actions by NOAA and the US Department of Justice. Section III will clearly define
the goals for any proposed statutory or regulatory changes and review the metrics for success
before analyzing the applicability of legal innovations from other areas of law (strict liability,
private enforcement, fee shifting, qui tam lawsuits, and insurance as quasi-regulator). Section IV
will restate the chosen elements of the proposed scheme, and section V will speculate as to
regime’s impact on typical enforcement scenarios.
II. THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM AND THE STATE OF THE LAW
A. The Problem
Seafood substitution is not a new phenomenon. For example, the use of surimi, a fish
paste that can imitate crab, lobster and other shellfish, dates back centuries in Japan and is used
to this day, 12 sometimes transparently,13 at other times not.14 Over the past decade, however,

names for seafood sold in interstate commerce and to assist manufacturers in labeling seafood
products. . . FDA’s guidance documents, including this guidance, do not establish legally
enforceable responsibilities. Instead, guidances describe the Agency's current thinking on a topic
and should be viewed only as recommendations. . .”).
11 PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON COMBATING IUU FISHING AND SEAFOOD FRAUD, at 3-4 (March
2015), http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/ia/iuu/noaa_taskforce_report_final.pdf.
12 Seafood Q&A: What is Surimi?, SEAFOODHEALTHF ACTS. ORG,
http://www.seafoodhealthfacts.org/faq/what-surimi (last visited Jan. 9, 2017).
13 See e.g., Simply Surimi, Flake Style, TRANSOCEAN PRODUCTS, http://trans-ocean.com/ourproducts/simply-surimi/flake-style/ (last visited Jan. 9, 2017) (“This great-tasting seafood is
certified gluten-free and certified sustainable by MSC and heart healthy by the American Heart
Association.”).
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concerted efforts by government agencies, the traditional press, and non-governmental
organizations (“NGOs”) have revealed that mislabeling is endemic across the U.S. seafood
supply chain, exceeding thirty-percent in all seafood nationally, with higher rates of fraud in
several major metropolitan areas. 15 The National Marine Fisheries Service (“NMFS”) voluntary
seafood inspection program also documents a forty-percent rate of mislabeling among submitted
products.16 While direct extrapolation from these studies is slightly fraught, 17 they yield an
estimate that more than one and a half billion pounds of mislabeled seafood moves through the
U.S. market annually. 18
Although this comment focuses on the economic impact of seafood substitution, and the
estimated twenty-five billion dollars in economic cost to U.S. consumers and businesses,19
rampant levels of seafood substitution impact other areas of policy. Seafood mislabeling
negatively affects environmental concerns by undercutting fisheries management through
misreported statistics on fish consumption, which can lead to inaccurate estimates being used in
setting catch limits. 20 Similarly, mislabeling can confuse consumers into thinking endangered
fisheries are healthy and abundant, discouraging them from adjusting their purchasing habits
towards more sustainable sources. 21
Widespread seafood mislabeling also implicates food safety. For example, tilefish is
often substituted for grouper, but has a much higher level of mercury accumulation. 22 Inaccurate
labeling could easily result in overconsumption of mercury among pregnant woman or other
populations subject to enhanced risk. Moreover, marketing escolar as “white tuna” or
“butterfish” exposes diners to explosive gastrointestinal distress from indigestible gempylotoxin

14

See e.g., Felicity Lawrence, Diner is left shellshocked over crab dish, THE GUARDIAN, May 2,
2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/02/diner-shellshocked-crab-dish-frankiebennys-surimi.
15 OCEANA Study 2013, supra note 2 (39% in New York, 38% in South Florida, 36% in
Denver, 56% in Pittsburgh, 32% in Chicago, 49% in Austin/Houston, 38% in Northern
California, 52% in Southern California and 33% nationwide); Stephen Wagner, Note, When
Tuna Still Isn't Always Tuna: Federal Food Safety Regulatory Regime Continues to Inadequately
Address Seafood Fraud, 20 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 111, 113-15 (2015).
16 Gill Paterson, et al, Seafood Fraud in the United States: Current Science and Policy Options,
UNIV. OF MINNESOTA FOOD POLICY RESEARCH CENTER (Feb. 2015),
https://www.foodpolicy.umn.edu/policy-summaries-and-analyses/seafood-fraud-united-statescurrent-science-and-policy-options; see generally GAO SEAFOOD FRAUD, supra note 7.
17 The conglomeration of fraud data and its extension to the overall supply of seafood is not
strictly a haddock to haddock comparison—most of the NGO and press reports focus on retail or
restaurant level sales while government enforcement efforts are generally focused on importers,
distributors and wholesalers. Extrapolation across categories may underestimate the actual
incidence of seafood mislabeling in any given species or product type.
18 See also Lou, Bait and Switch, supra note 3; OCEANA Study 2013, supra note 2; Paterson,
supra note 16.
19 Lou, Bait and Switch, supra note 3.
20 Wagner, supra note 15, at 117.
21 Id.
22 Id.
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(wax esters) in the meat of the fish. 23 Extensive use of antibiotics and chemical additives in
aquaculture becomes a more dangerous proposition when consumers cannot distinguish wild
caught seafood (such as salmon or shrimp) from similar farmed varieties at the restaurant or
grocery store. 24 This situation is even more concerning because many exporting countries
provide minimal or no oversight of their aquaculture industry. 25
B. Enforcement Resources and the Current State of the Law
Unfortunately the many studies of seafood substitution provide only minimal evidence
regarding intention and responsibility.26 While researchers tend to blame foreign producers and
importers for the bulk of seafood fraud, substitution has been documented at every level of the
U.S. supply chain. 27 Substitution, from negligent mislabeling to blatant fraud, is further enabled
by an underfunded patchwork of regulatory and enforcement regimes at the federal and state
levels. Federally, seafood is regulated by NOAA, the Food & Drug Administration (“FDA”),
U.S. Customs & Border Protection (“CBP”), U.S. Department of Agriculture (“USDA”), and the
Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), but a lack of cross agency coordination is frequently cited
as one of the barriers to effective prevention and enforcement. 28
1. Primary Federal Agencies Tasked with Enforcement
Primary management of U.S. fisheries and ocean resources resides with the NOAA
National Marine Fisheries Service (“NMFS”) under the U.S. Department of Commerce. 29 In
addition to managing the coastal fisheries, NMFS and the NOAA Office of Law Enforcement
(“OLE”) investigate noncompliance from seafood mislabeling to stolen lobster traps, and refer

23

Use Caution When Eating Escolar, THE K ITCHN, http://www.thekitchn.com/use-caution-wheneating-escola-66602 (last visited Oct. 24, 2015) (Escolar is banned in Japan and Italy, and
requires a warning label in Canada, Sweden and Demark). The author would like to note that
escolar is delicious in taste and exceptional is texture, it is the consumption of more than a small
portion that produces the gastrointestinal concerns. The choice of whether or not to eat escolar,
also called “ex-lax” fish, and risk an embarrassing and uncomfortable reaction, should be the
right of a fully informed consumer.
24 Lou, Bait and Switch, supra note 3.
25 Id.
26 Abelson & Daley, On the Menu, supra note 3; Daley & Abelson, Fish Supply Chain Open to
Abuse, supra note 3; Lou, Bait and Switch, supra note 3; Danna, supra note 3; see generally
OCEANA Study 2013, supra note 2.
27 Abelson & Daley, On the Menu, supra note 3; Daley & Abelson, Fish Supply Chain Open to
Abuse, supra note 3; Danna, supra note 3; GAO SEAFOOD FRAUD, supra note 7; Lou, Bait and
Switch, supra note 3; OCEANA Study 2013, supra note 2.
28 GAO SEAFOOD FRAUD, supra note 7, at 2-3; Lou, Bait and Switch, supra note 3;
PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON COMBATING IUU FISHING AND SEAFOOD FRAUD supra note 11, at
24.
29 Our Mission, NOAA FISHERIES, http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/aboutus/our_mission.html (last
visited Jan 10, 2017).
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seafood substitution cases to the Department of Justice for prosecution under the Lacey Act 30 or
the Magnuson-Stevens Fisheries Conservation and Management Act. 31 NOAA NMFS regulates
all U.S. Coastal Fisheries from three miles out to two hundred miles offshore (or nine miles to
two hundred miles off various parts of Texas), but has fewer than 100 agents for the entire
country.32 Despite being responsible for the inspection and safety of billions of pounds of
seafood, NMFS has cut the number of field investigators from 147 in 2008 to a mere ninety-three
in 2014.33 Over the same time period, NOAA records reflect a precipitous seventy-five percent
drop in prosecutions for seafood fraud, from 793 to 215.34
Additionally, while the FDA is responsible for the overall safety of the U.S. food supply,
it does not regulate most meat products, which are under the purview of the USDA
(supplemented by equivalent state inspection programs), and takes a very limited role in
combating seafood fraud.35 The FDA has 1,100 inspectors on staff and is responsible for
167,000 processing facilities, which are inspected “routinely” in relation to the risks presented. 36
“Routinely” may mean once every ten years.37 Moreover, the FDA is estimated to inspect less
than two-percent of imported seafood and has generally failed to bring a concerted effort to
address economic fraud. 38 However, that agency does maintain the Seafood List, which crossreferences official species names against vernacular and marketing names for seafood. While the
Seafood List does not carry any legal authority, it does provide guidance about what the FDA
considers acceptable naming and marketing conventions. 39 For example, a search for “snapper”
yields 56 species of fish that the FDA considers marketable under the name “snapper,” including
such fish as Grey Snapper, Crimson Jobfish, and Twinspot Snapper. 40
2. The Lacey Act & Other Federal Proposals (SAFE Seafood Act)

30

The Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371-3378 (2016) (Conservation law passed in 1900 that creates
civil and criminal penalties for interstate trading in prohibited plants and animals, as well as
trading in any wildlife that has been illegally harvested in its origin jurisdiction. Also provides
criminal penalties for intentional mislabeling of wildlife and any derived products.).
31 Magnuson-Stevens Fisheries Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1884
(2016) (Passed in 1976 the Magnuson-Stevens Act regulates US fisheries for long-term
biological and economic sustainability.).
32 Rentz, supra note 6.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 GAO SEAFOOD FRAUD, supra note 7, at 2-3.
36 FDA Basics: How often does FDA inspect food manufacturing facilities? U.S. FOOD AND
DRUG ADMINISTRATION, http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/Transparency/Basics/ucm194242.htm
(last visited Oct 16, 2015).
37 Nathan M. Trexler, Note, "Market" Regulation: Confronting Industrial Agriculture's Food
Safety Failures, 17 WIDENER L. REV. 311, 323 (2011).
38 GAO SEAFOOD FRAUD, supra note 7, at 2, 5, 13.
39 FDA Seafood List, supra note 10.
40 Id. (note that only one singular fish, Lutjanus campechanus, is marketable as “red snapper”
according to the Seafood List).
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The Lacey Act, originally passed in 1900, creates civil and criminal penalties for those
trading in prohibited plants and wildlife and makes it a crime to sell or transport any animals or
plants that have been illegally harvested under state, federal or foreign law. 41 The original
intention of the Act was to address poaching and the preservation of game animals by making it
a federal crime to poach in one state and sell the catch across state lines. 42 This enhancement of
existing state laws attempted to remove any viable interstate profit from the activity. In addition
to prohibiting the transport and sale of illegally harvested wildlife and plants, the Lacey Act also
provides criminal penalties for mislabeling:
It is unlawful for any person to make or submit any false record, account, or label
for, or any false identification of, any fish, wildlife, or plant which has been, or is
intended to be (1) imported, exported, transported, sold, purchased, or received
from any foreign country; or (2) transported in interstate or foreign commerce. 43
Further, depending on the value of the mislabeled fish at issue, the Act provides civil fines of up
to $10,000, and criminal penalties include up to five years of imprisonment as well as fines of
$350,000 for individuals and $500,000 for organizations.44 While a robust and flexible tool, the
Lacey Act is used almost exclusively in enforcement against importers, wholesaler/distributors,
and fishermen. The Lacey Act does not, and cannot, address retail or restaurant labeling, and
thus leaves enforcement of these primarily intra-state commerce issues to local authorities under
applicable state fraud, mislabeling, and consumer protection statutes.
In response to media and NGO investigations of seafood substitution, 45 Rep. Edward
Markey introduced the Safety and Fraud Enforcement for Seafood Act (“SAFE Seafood Act”) in
2012 and 2013.46 The SAFE Seafood Act would have imposed stricter labeling requirements
(species, acceptable name, origin, harvest method, date of catch, weight, processing location,
farmed status, fresh/frozen status), moved responsibility for maintaining the Seafood List from
FDA to HHS, encouraged inter agency cooperation, affirmed FDA’s primacy on inspections and
required the FDA to begin addressing economic fraud as part of its existing inspection scheme.47
The SAFE Act would also have provided enforcement powers and penalties in line with the
Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act §§ 308 through 311.48 The 2013
41

16 U.S.C. §§ 3371-3378 (2016).
Rebecca F. Wisch Overview of the Lacey Act (16 U.S.C. §§ 3371-3378), MICHIGAN STATE
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW ANIMAL LEGAL & HISTORICAL CENTER,
https://www.animallaw.info/article/overview-lacey-act-16-usc-ss-3371-3378 (last visited Jan 7,
2017).
43 16 U.S.C. § 3372(d) (2012).
44 16 U.S.C. §§ 3373(a)(1), (d)(3) (2012); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3771(b)(3), (c)(3) (2012).
45 See Rep. Markey Introduces SAFE Seafood Act to Combat Fish Fraud, FOOD S AFETY NEWS
(Mar 8, 2013), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2013/03/rep-market-introduces-safe-seafoodact-to-combat-fish-fraud/#.Vxf_QjArKM9.
46 Safety and Fraud Enforcement for Seafood Act, H.R. 6200, 112th Cong. (2012) (reintroduced
on Mar. 6, 2013 as H.R. 1012); Safety and Fraud Enforcement for Seafood Act, S. 520, 113th
Cong. (2013).
47 Id.
48 Id.
42
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version of the SAFE Seafood Act was referred to multiple committees within the House of
Representatives, nevertheless, no further action was taken.49
3. Presidential Task Force on IUU Fishing
Created in 2014, the Presidential Task Force on Combating Illegal, Unreported, and
Unregulated (“IUU”) Fishing and Seafood Fraud brought together thirteen federal agencies 50 to
provide recommendations for the establishment of a “comprehensive framework of integrated
programs to combat IUU fishing and seafood fraud that emphasizes the greatest need.”51 The
task force produced fifteen broad recommendations to combat IUU fishing and seafood fraud at
the international level by strengthening enforcement tools, enhancing inter-agency and FederalState coordination and information sharing, and increasing traceability requirements. 52 While all
of the recommendations would have at least a collateral impact on reducing seafood substitution,
six are particularly relevant to combating the consumer-facing economic fraud this comment is
most concerned with: #8 expanding enforcement information sharing across key
agencies/departments tasked with enforcement; #10 providing clearer industry guidance on
acceptable marketing names and coordinating the FDA Seafood List with Harmonized Tariff
Schedule (HTS) codes for imported seafood products to reduce confusion; #11 enhanced
cooperation between federal agencies and State/Local enforcement using tools like NOAA’s
Cooperation Enforcement Program, FDA state food safety inspection contracts, and increased
fraud detection and prosecution training for state agencies; #12 expanding enforcement resources
and law enforcement tools for with existing regulatory authority; #14 and # 15 develop and

159 CONG. REC. H1319 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 2013) (statement of Mr. Markey) (“A bill to
strengthen Federal consumer protection and product traceability with respect to commercially
marketed seafood, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and in
addition to the Committees on Agriculture, Natural Resources, and Ways and Means, for a
period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such
provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.”); 159 CONG. REC. S1592
(daily ed. Mar. 11, 2013) (statement of Mr. Begich) (“A bill to strengthen Federal consumer
protection and product traceability with respect to commercially marketed seafood, and for other
purposes; to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.”).
50 Presidential Task Force on Combating IUU Fishing and Seafood Fraud members agencies
(and sub agencies): Department of Agriculture, Department of Commerce (including NOAA),
Department of Defense (Navy), Department of Health and Human Services (including FDA),
Department of the Interior (including U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service), Department of Justice,
Department of State (including the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and
Scientific Affairs), Federal Trade Commission, U.S. Agency for International Development and
the Executive Office of the President (including the Council on Environmental Quality, National
Security Council, Office of Management and Budget, Office of Science and Technology Policy
and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative).
51 PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON COMBATING IUU FISHING AND SEAFOOD FRAUD supra note 11,
at 3.
52 Id. at 10-39.
49
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establish an international traceability program to track seafood from harvest through its entry
into the stream of U.S. commerce.53
Indeed, the traceability program detailed in the task force’s report has been promulgated
into a final rule creating the Seafood Traceability Program, which was published in December
2016, and will take effect in 2018.54 The program requires the importer of record for certain
species of seafood that are commonly mislabeled or harvested illegally55 to receive a permit from
NMFS, as well as to electronically file species, harvest event, point of origin (harvest area or
aquaculture facility), processing information, and landing data for each shipment prior to entry.56
Importers under this program may be subject to field audits, and are therefore also required to
retain both electronic and paper records pertaining to each shipment for two-years.57
These heightened documentary requirements will certainly help with NOAA OLE’s
existing enforcement priorities, but the Seafood Traceability Program remains an incomplete
solution. While the Program applies to some of the most frequently substituted species, its
coverage is far from comprehensive and only includes imported fish products at the time of
entry. Thus, it provides no new protections for consumers of domestically harvested or
processed seafood and continues. Moreover, even with increased traceability, national
enforcement is still left to fewer than a hundred agents.
Additional administrative and legislative action will be required to actualize the
remainder of the Task Force’s recommendations, but it remains unclear how the Trump
administration will allocate resources to fight economic fraud in general, or seafood substitution
in particular. Given Congress’s inability to pass even routine funding bills in a timely manner,
executive leadership on the issue is a must. Unfortunately, barring some surge in personal
interest from President Trump, or the Secretaries of Commerce or HHS, the Task Force’s
comprehensive recommendations are likely to remain hostage to Washington’s legislative
dysfunction and deregulatory zeal.
4. State Laws and Proposals
Reacting to public concern and increased press coverage of seafood fraud, the legislatures
of New York and Massachusetts attempted to address seafood substitution at the retail level in
2013 and 2014, only to have the proposed bills die quietly in committee. 58 Virtually identical
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See id.
See generally Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act; Seafood Import
Monitoring Program, 81 Fed. Reg. 88975-02 (Dec. 9, 2016) (to be codified as 50 C.F.R. Parts
300 and 600.).
55 Id. (to be codified as 50 C.F.R. § 300.324(a)(2)) (“Atlantic Cod; Pacific Cod; Blue Crab; Red
King Crab; Dolphinfish (Mahi Mahi); Grouper; Red Snapper; Sea Cucumber; Sharks; Swordfish;
Tunas (Albacore, Bigeye, Skipjack, Yellowfin, and Bluefin).”).
56 Id. (to be codified as 50 C.F.R. § 300.324(b)(3)).
57 Id. (to be codified as 50 C.F.R. § 300.324(d)).
58 H.B. 1946, 188th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2013) (reported favorably by Joint Committee on Public
Health, referred to Committee on Ways and Means July 22 2013); A.B. 9620, 237th Leg. Sess.
(N.Y. 2014) (Introduced and referred to the Agriculture Committee on May 13, 2014).
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bills were reintroduced in both states during the 2015 and 2016 sessions, where New York’s
finally passed.59 Massachusetts’ third attempt remains parked in committee awaiting attention. 60
New York’s law, which took effect in January 2017, is quite limited, but explicitly
prohibits the marketing of escolar as “white tuna.”61 Under the law, restaurants, retailers, and
wholesalers mislabeling the dreaded “ex-lax fish” would face a $600 fine for the first offense,
with multiple offenses rising to $1,200 per day of violation, and is enforced by the New York
Department of Agriculture and Markets.62 It is not yet clear if the newly implemented provision
will yield any noticeable enforcement action or change in restaurant marketing practices.
In Massachusetts, the most recent draft of the proposed bill bans the sale of escolar
completely, fining purveyors $400 for a first offense, and $800 for further violations. 63 The
proposed legislation also provided penalties for mislabeling local favorites, specifically Atlantic
Cod, Atlantic Halibut, Grey Sole, and Red Snapper, and the mislabeling of Pacific Cod which is
frequently used as a substitute.64 Fines would start at $800 for the first offense and $1,600 for
additional violations, along with the possible revocation of the fraudulent purveyor’s commercial
licenses.65 Inspections would be handled by the Department of Public Health and the
Department of Fish and Game. 66
Unlike states that have offered solutions targeted at seafood substitution, Florida has
implemented a broad statute directly targeted at restaurant and retail mislabeling which has been
applied to fish fraud. Florida Statute § 509.292 sets forth:
An operator may not knowingly and willfully misrepresent the identity of any
food or food product to any of the patrons of such establishment. The identity of
food or a food product is misrepresented if:
(a) The description of the food or food product is false or misleading in any
particular;
(b) The food or food product is served, sold, or distributed under the name of
another food or food product; or
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A.B. 1231, 238th Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2015) (signed by governor on Sep. 9, 2016); H.B. 1939,
189th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2015) (Joint Committee on Public Health reviewed as part of hearing on
Sep. 17, 2015, report not yet available); H.B. 4066, 189th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2016).
60 H.B. 4066, 189th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2016) (referred to House Committee on Bills in the Third
Reading).
61 N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 201-i(2) (2016) (“No person, wholesaler, distributor, retail food
store or food service establishment shall willfully sell, offer for sale, distribute, import, or export
the species of fish commonly known as escolar or oilfish under the name tuna, albacore tuna,
white tuna, or any other species name, common or scientific, other than the recognized common
or scientific species names for such species defined in subdivision one of this section.”); see also
N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 201-i(1)(c) (2016) (“‘white tuna’ shall mean the fish species
known as albacore tuna, long fin tuna, or the scientific species name thunnus alalunga.”).
62 N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 39 (2016).
63 H.B. 4066, 189th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2016).
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id.
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(c) The food or food product purports to be or is represented as a food or food
product that does not conform to a definition of identity and standard of quality if
such definition of identity and standard of quality has been established by custom
and usage.67
§ 509.292 violations carry penalties of up to $800,68 and are proven by comparing invoices and
inventory with the menu, rather than the potentially costly DNA testing used in most NGO
studies. Despite this, Florida has been comparatively aggressive in enforcement and between
2006 and 2012, 1,400 citations were issued for violation of the food code by restaurants. 69
Unfortunately, the scale of the violations makes clear that the penalty is not strong enough to
deter the profit motive behind the fraud.
5. Relevant Maine Statutes
Intentional seafood mislabeling by restaurants, retailers, or wholesalers would appear to
meet the elements of Deceptive Business Practices, a class D crime in Maine: “(1) A person is
guilty of deceptive business practices if, in the course of engaging in a business, occupation or
profession, he intentionally: (D) Sells, offers or exposes for sale any commodity which is
adulterated or mislabeled.”70 Further, Maine’s law on the labeling of shellfish states:
A person who is authorized to hold or possess shellfish under chapter 623 may not
label shellfish sold alive using the words “product of Maine” or any other similar
words or terms that misleadingly suggest the shellfish was taken from the waters
of this State unless the shellfish was in fact taken from the waters of the State.
The sale of shellfish labeled in violation of this section is a deceptive business
practice in violation of Title 17-A, section 901.71
The seafood mislabeling provision was passed in 2011 specifically to address concerns that
shellfish from out of state was being processed in Maine and then relabeled as a native product
and sold to tourists.72 While the statute is only on point for a very specific type of seafood
substitution, it is a simple extrapolation that other instances of intentional seafood mislabeling
could fall under Deceptive Business Practices, with two major caveats.
First, it provides authority only for the identification of shellfish by its place of origin (i.e.
from Maine or not).73 No other type of seafood is addressed by the statute, so extending
Deceptive Business Practices further may be more problematic than is obvious. Recall that the
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FLA. STAT. ANN. § 509.292(1)(a)-(c) (LexisNexis through 2016 Reg. Sess.).
See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 775.082 and 775.083 (LexisNexis through 2016 Reg. Sess.).
69 Danna, supra note 3.
70 ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 901 (2016).
71 ME. REV. STAT. tit. 12, § 6005 (2016).
72 SHELLFISH--BRANDS, MARKS AND LABELS, 2011 Me. Legis. Serv. Ch. 234 (H.P.
1035) (L.D. 1409).
73 ME. REV. STAT. tit. 12, § 6005.
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FDA Seafood List does not have authority to create enforceable obligations,74 moreover, there is
no comprehensive state equivalent in Maine. While Maine could bolster enforcement, it may
first require legislative action to create legal authority for seafood naming conventions. One may
think that if ever there was something Maine’s elected officials could agree on it would be
protecting Maine’s brand and the livelihood of local fishermen by providing enforcement against
fraud “from away.”
Yet, despite this impulse, the shellfish labelling statute remains a symbolic law with
minimal teeth and limited and unpublicized enforcement.75 Maine’s former colonial master,
Massachusetts, which has a similar cultural history glorifying the nobility and economic vitality
of fishing (particularly fishing for Atlantic Cod), serves as a similarly contrary example. The
Massachusetts Legislature is poised for its third consecutive failure to adopt anti-substitution
laws to protect local specialties (Atlantic Cod, Atlantic Halibut, Grey Sole, and Red Snapper).76
Second, given the minimal monetary damages from any individual instance of a
consumer-facing seafood mislabeling, it is unlikely that Maine’s law enforcement community
will prioritize the issue without further prompting. What branch of law or code enforcement is
responsible for detecting seafood substitution? Is it law enforcement such as Maine State
Troopers or local police departments? It seems politically laughable to even consider asking
such groups to prioritize economic fraud over more general public safety concerns. Could
enforcement be handled by municipal code officers or perhaps the Department of Health? Would
it be feasible? Would it be appropriate to task health inspectors with anti-fraud enforcement?
Even in Portland, Maine’s most populous city, and culinary hot spot, 77 the approximately 800
restaurants are subject to food service inspections less than once every six months on average.78
Currently the inspection form contains a single relevant item under good retail practices, and
food inspection, asking only if “Food properly labeled; original container.” 79
6. The Enforcement Gap
Given that Federal agencies have limited enforcement resources to dedicate to
prosecuting seafood substitution, a focus on the largest malefactors makes some degree of
74

FDA Seafood List, supra note 10.
No examples of enforcement have been obtained despite a reasonably exhaustive search.
76 H.B. 4066, 189th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2016); H.B. 1939, 189th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2015); H.B. 1946,
188th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2013).
77 Patty Lee, The 10 Hottest Restaurants in Portland, Maine, ZAGATS, (July 8, 2016),
https://www.zagat.com/b/the-10-hottest-restaurants-in-portland-maine; See also, Mathew
Moragan, Take to the High Seas in Portland, Maine, THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE (Aug.
19, 2015), http://nymag.com/travel/weekend-escapes/portlandmaine2015/.
78 Food Service Establishment Inspection Reports, PORTLAND M AINE,
http://www.portlandmaine.gov/640/Food-Service-Establishment-Inspection-Re (last visited Nov
28, 2015) (diner complaints will prompt additional inspections, inspection failure also generates
a remedial follow-up inspection).
79 See e.g. 3 Buoys Seafood Shanty & Grill, STATE OF MAINE HEALTH INSPECTION REPORT (Nov
29, 2015),
http://24.39.51.187/hhs/reports/3%20BUOYS%20SEAFOOD%20SHANTY%20&%20GRILL_
81915.pdf.
75
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economic sense as an efficient use of those resources. However, by only prosecuting multimillion dollar examples of fraud, the government is leaving the vast majority of consumer facing
fish frauds undetected and allowing most fraudsters to operate essentially without consequence.
Individual retailers and restaurants face minimal fines in a few jurisdictions, but for most of the
country the penalties for being caught in even the most egregious of fish frauds is a bit of public
shaming by the local press that appears to be quickly forgotten.80 Given that state agency
budgets are even more constrained than their federal counterparts, and the failure of most state
legislatures to pass enforceable statutes to address the issue, it seems at best unrealistic to expect
states to step into a traditional command and control method of regulating seafood sales. To that
end, a more unconventional approach is required.
C. Insufficient Funds: Why Consumers Are Not Pursuing Claims for Fraudulent
Misrepresentation
Seafood substitution meets the common law definition of fraudulent misrepresentation,
and actions could be brought by consumers against restaurants or retailers if they could make a
prima facie case. Under Maine law, for example, a claim of fraudulent misrepresentation for
seafood substitution would require proof by clear and convincing evidence that:
(1) that [the fish seller] made a false representation (2) of a
material fact (3) with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless
disregard of whether it is true or false (4) for the purpose of
inducing [the consumer] to act in reliance upon it, and (5) [the
consumer] justifiably relied upon the representation as true and
acted upon it to [their] damage. 81
While it may be logistically difficult to acquire evidence of each element, for a proto-typical
example of fish fraud, none of the elements are truly insurmountable. Elements (1), (2), (3) and
(4) could be satisfied by documentation that the seafood listed on the menu and that which was
delivered to the customer were materially different types of seafood. These elements could be
proven through DNA sequencing of the diner’s meal, if possible, but more likely they could be
inferred through a comparison of the diner’s receipt and the restaurant’s supplier invoices from
the relevant time period. The issue of damages (5) turns out to be the limiting factor, but not
because they are unprovable.
For the potential consumer plaintiff and their prospective lawyer the largest barrier to
bringing an action for fraudulent misrepresentation in a case of seafood substitution turns out to
be the very limited nature of the damages involved. Simply put, it is hard to envision a situation
involving any individual consumer subjected to intentional fish fraud where more than a few
80

Jenn Abelson & Beth Daley, Many Mass. Restaurants Still Serve Mislabeled Fish, THE
BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 2, 2012,
http://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2012/12/02/dnasidebar/SAe6PdZMRqi6mZUDOdWz7M/
story.html; Lou, Bait and Switch, supra note 3; Daley & Abelson, Fish Supply Chain Open to
Abuse, supra note 3.
81 Maine Eye Care Associates P.A. v. Gorman, 2006 ME 15, ¶ 19, 890 A.2d 707, 711 (quoting
Mariello v. Giguere, 667 A.2d 588, 590 (Me. 1995)).
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hundred dollars’ worth of pecuniary damages is at stake (perhaps a few thousand if someone
purchased a lobster dinner for a wedding party). This is assuming that damages will be assessed
at some multiple (one to three times) of the face value of the mislabeled fish and not at the
difference in value between the fish listed on the menu and that actually served. As such, it is
simply not worth the time, effort, or legal bills, to pursue an individual claim for seafood
substitution. Thus any workable solution will require related claims to be aggregated or
organized into larger, economically viable cases.
III. ASSEMBLING A STATE BASED SOLUTION TO SEAFOOD SUBSTITUTION
A. Defining Success
The goal of this proposal is not to provide extensive damage awards to defrauded
consumers, although that may be the short-term result. Fundamentally, the objective is to reduce
or eliminate retail and restaurant based seafood substitution without requiring state (in this case
Maine) or federal agencies to substantially increase or reallocate enforcement resources. The use
of extensive damage provisions and/or fee shifting are merely tools that will be deployed to
address a systemic problem. To be clear, while it is hard to predict the actual numeric
relationship between enforcement funding and the incidence of fraud, it is easy to infer from
current experience that increased spending on enforcement would indeed lead to a reduction.82
This self-imposed limit on additional government resources is not driven by any ideological
dedication to smaller government, but rather by a “settled hopeless expectation”83 that our
dysfunctional political environment makes any further direct allocation of regulatory and
enforcement resources virtually impossible. To that end, this comment makes the assumption
that a workable proposal must find a way to promote detection of fraud by consumers, rather
than by adding or redeploying highly trained law enforcement or code enforcement officials, and
that enforcement/retributive actions must require the minimum viable use of government
resources. When government involvement is inevitable, it must attempt to provide for those
resources through recovery, fines, and penalties.
In addition to increasing the likelihood of exposure, a feasible proposal must provide an
adequate economic deterrent to seafood substitution. This impacts both the calculation of
damages, which could be some multiple of the price paid for the mislabeled seafood or some
nominal fee amount per incident, as well as addressing ways to organize cases into larger judicial
units,84 such that recovery is large enough to support the legal action required. The economic
consequences could be further enhanced by shifting legal fees for a prevailing plaintiff.
Finally, although invoking strict liability is likely a piece of the solution critical to
streamlining the use of judicial resources, a workable proposal must differentiate bad faith actors
engaged in active fraud from the hapless and easily duped. There is a certain truth to the
culinary proverb that the deep fat fryer is the great equalizer—after a piece of seafood is breaded
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See Lou, Bait and Switch, supra note 3; Wagner, supra note 15; see also Daley & Abelson,
Fish Supply Chain Open to Abuse, supra note 3.
83 Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 100 (1933) (quoting Willes, J. in Reg. v. Peel, 2 F. & F.
21, 22).
84 A hearty thank you to Prof. Petruccelli of the University of Maine School of Law for inserting
this concept into the author’s lexicon during Civil Procedure II.
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and fried it is indeed rather difficult to identify, even for trained professionals.85 Thus, there are
probably some restaurants and retailers that have been confused or defrauded by their
wholesalers and suppliers, and as such should be able to seek indemnity for any substitution
liability from the ultimately responsible party.86 Furthermore, as this proposal is intended to
reduce fraudulent behavior it must avoid creating a new mechanism for legal harassment and
nuisance suits. Thus some measure of fee shifting may also be employed to protect prevailing
restaurants and retailers from plaintiffs caught acting in bad faith. 87
B. Modeling Effective Economic Deterrence
Seafood substitution is primarily driven by a desire to enhance profitability, either
through lower costs or higher prices. If the fraudulent profitability can be wrung out, even
statistically, the prevalence is likely to drop. Therefore, in contemplating the scale of the
damages and fees required to align the retail and restaurant industries against seafood
substitution, it is useful to explore quasi-mathematical models similar to Justice Learned Hand’s
famous B<PL balancing test for the burden of prevention in negligence cases.88 While this type
of formula assumes that the actor considering mislabeling their fish is behaving rationally, a
substantively and substantially debatable assumption, it provides a useful baseline from which to
evaluate the economic considerations of this tortious behavior.
Where Justice Hand’s formula was concerned with the burden of prevention (B), and the
probability of an injury (P) if not prevented multiplied by the likely damages caused by the
injury (L), the economic motivations of seafood substitutions is comprised of: excess/fraudulent
profit generated by seafood substitution (denoted as πf); the probability of detection (D); and the
penalty for detection (Pd). In order to align against substitution, the penalty, multiplied by the
likelihood of detection, must exceed the fraudulent profit generated (𝜋𝑓 < 𝐷𝑃𝑑 ). Or stated in
reverse, a rational fish fraudster will engage in seafood substitution so long as the profit exceeds
the chance of detection times the penalty ( 𝜋𝑓 > 𝐷𝑃𝑑 ). Using this lens to analyze the current
situation, where the likelihood of detection is anemic, and the possible legal89 and extra-legal90
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See also This American Life: Doppelgängers, CHICAGO PUBLIC RADIO (Jan. 11, 2013),
available at: https://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/484/doppelgangers?act=1
(Act 1: investigating the veracity of an anecdotal report that pork bung (a.k.a. pork rectum) is
sold as imitation calamari, and then examining the practicality of doing so through a side-by-side
taste-test). While somewhat disconcerting, this is one of the most entertaining media reports on
the issue of seafood substitution. Early in the episode is also a hilarious imitation of Ira Glass by
Portlandia creator Fred Armisen.
86 Daley & Abelson, Fish Supply Chain Open to Abuse, supra note 3.
87 E.g., Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692k (2016) (“On a finding by the
court that an action under this section was brought in bad faith and for the purpose of
harassment, the court may award to the defendant attorney's fees reasonable in relation to the
work expended and costs.”).
88 See generally United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
89 A conviction for Deceptive Business Practices in Maine (Title 17-A, § 901) is a Class D crime
carrying a maximum penalty of $2,000 or one year in county jail. Ignoring the possibility of jail
time, imagine a scenario where the probability of detection is roughly 2%. Analyzed through the
lens of 𝜋𝑓 < 𝐷𝑃𝑑 and 𝜋𝑓 > 𝐷𝑃𝑑 , any profit of greater than $40 (.02 x $2,000 = $40) a month in
212

penalties are minimal to nonexistent, there is no effective economic deterrent. Unsurprisingly,
the market is rampant with mislabeled fish. However, this exercise reveals that as the possibility
of detection rises, the penalty can fall while still maintaining the incentive against fish fraud.
Conversely, if the detection rate approaches zero, the formula makes clear that the nominal
deterrent will need to increase towards infinity to be effective. An impractical and daunting
solution. Indeed, a workable proposal to address consumer facing seafood substitution should
attempt to increase both the probability of detection and the resulting penalty in order to
maximize deterrence.
It is worth noting that the formula assumes away a great deal of complexity that could
seriously impact the practicality of enforcement – including any probable correlation between
variables, even those that could work to the advantage of any prevention scheme. What we see
from federal enforcement of mislabeled seafood under the Lacey Act is that the scale of the
fraud, and thus the possible scale of the fines and penalties, anecdotally appears to have a
positive correlation with the allocation of investigative resources. Moreover, economic
ramifications of setting the nominal penalty for detection, modified by the scope of time over
which an individual case can consider infractions, will determine the viability of all of the
possible mechanisms outlined below. A penalty that is too low will fail to align incentives and
thus fail to deter the behavior. Conversely, a penalty that is too high could result in certain
closure for retailers and restaurants that were merely negligent and not engaged in a systematic
fraud. The total value of the penalty will be determined by the scope of the actual or nominal
damages to the consumer, as well as any imposition of a per claim or per incident (each piece of
mislabeled fish) statutory penalty. Possible penalty levels will be further discussed under each
legal mechanism considered in the following section.
C. Borrowing From Other Areas of Law
1. Qui Tam Actions under the False Claims Act and Similar Statutes
One possible tool that could be brought to bear against the seafood substitution epidemic
would be qui tam91 lawsuits in the model enabled by the Federal False Claims Act (“FFCA”).92

Maine would be statistically sustainable, and the fraudster would have no economic incentive to
change behavior. For perspective, $40 is the potential excess profit generated by substituting
frozen Pacific cod for fresh Atlantic cod in eight to twelve entrees. That is less than six pounds
of mislabeled cod (assuming very generous portions)—an amount that any seaside fish house
could sell in the first few minutes of the lunch rush in July.
90 Such as reputational damage, boycotts, customer switching, etc., which would increase the
nominal value of Pd in supra note 89. However, it should be noted that follow-up articles tend to
reveal that even well documented mislabeling at restaurants is usually not corrected despite
public shaming and extensive negative coverage (see Daley & Abelson, Fish Supply Chain Open
to Abuse, supra note 3; Abelson & Daley, On the Menu, supra note 3; Abelson & Daley, Many
Mass. Restaurants Still Serve Mislabeled Fish, supra note 80). This implies that the extra-legal
costs to restaurants caught substituting seafood are relatively low.
91 “‘Qui Tam,’ comes from the Latin phrase, ‘qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac
parte sequitur,’ [which] translates into ‘who pursues this action on our Lord the King's behalf as
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Under the FFCA (and many state equivalents) any person (individual or corporate entity) that
submits certain types of fraudulent demands or claims for payment to the U.S. government is
liable for $5,000 to $10,000 in civil penalties, plus triple any damages the government would
have suffered because of the fraudulent demand. 93 Actions under the FFCA can be brought by
the U.S. Attorney General or by private parties, dubbed “relators,” that are an “original source”
of the information regarding the false claim. 94
Roughly outlined, when a relator brings an action under the FFCA the complaint is filed
in camera and remains under seal for at least 60 days to give the Government the opportunity to
receive the complaint and all relevant evidence, and decide whether or not to elect to intervene. 95
Should the Government choose to intervene and proceed with a relator initiated action it shall
assume “primary responsibility for prosecuting the action,” but does have discretion to dismiss
the action, settle with the defendant, or engage in alternative remedies (such as other
administrative procedures) with only limited review by the court for reasonableness and
fairness.96 If the Government then prevails in the FFCA claim, the initiating relator shall receive
fifteen to twenty-five percent of the recovered amount depending on their contribution to the
prosecution of the claim. 97 Should the Government elect not to pursue a relator’s claim, the
relator shall have the right to bring the action themselves. 98 If the relator then prevails, they shall
receive twenty-five to thirty percent of the proceeds recovered on the Government’s behalf, as
well as reasonable attorney’s fees, necessary expenses and costs. 99
In order to follow a similar model, the enabling legislation would first have to establish a
civil penalty for seafood substitution payable to the State, similar to the rules in Florida, 100 or that
proposed in Massachusetts. 101 To properly discourage substitution, the total civil penalties
related to an incident of fish fraud would need to be substantially higher than the $2,000 criminal
penalty currently provided in Maine for those convicted under Deceptive Business Practices
(Title 17-A, § 901), or the shellfish labeling provision (Title 12, § 6005).102
well as his own.’” Joseph E. B. White, U.S. False Claims Act: Deputizing the Public to Combat
Fraud, 38 FALSE CL. ACT AND QUI TAM Q. REV. 17 (July 2005).
92 31 U.S.C §§ 3729-3733 (2016).
93 31 U.S.C §3729(a)(1) (flush language); but see, 31 U.S.C. §3729(a)(2) (reduced damages of
not less than double the amount sustained by the government can be awarded in situations where
the liable party provides timely cooperation without knowledge of any investigation).
94 “‘Original source’ means an individual who either (i)(sic) prior to a public disclosure under
subsection (e)(4)(a), has voluntarily disclosed to the Government the information on which
allegations or transactions in a claim are based, or (2) who has knowledge that is independent of
and materially adds to the publicly disclosed allegations or transactions, and who has voluntarily
provided the information to the Government before filing an action under this section.”
31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B).
95 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2).
96 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c).
97 31 U.S.C. §3730(d)(1).
98 31 U.S.C. §3730(c)(3).
99 31 U.S.C. §3730(d)(2).
100 See F LA. STAT. ANN. § 509.292, § 775.082, and § 775.083.
101 H.B. 4066, 189th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2016).
102 See author’s analysis using 𝜋 < 𝐷𝑃 and 𝜋 > 𝐷𝑃 formulas, supra note 89.
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In considering the total possible penalty (𝑃𝑑 ), there are a number of potential sub
variables that will be determinative. Since the State has not suffered any direct loss based on the
true value of the seafood actually provided, or the nominal value of the seafood substituted,
neither could rationally serve as a basis for the damages. However, the options still include
arbitrarily set penalties constructed as a single large nominal fine for being caught, say $5,000 to
$10,000, or a smaller per incident (every plate of mislabeled fish proven to be served) that could
quickly accumulate from a pattern of misbehavior. For example, a $100 per incident penalty for
a high-volume restaurant, serving 100 portions of mislabeled fish a week, would potentially add
up to tens, or even hundreds, of thousands in fines depending on the time frame opened through
discovery.103 While such a system could differentiate between incidental/infrequent negligence
in labeling and systemic fraudulent behavior and business models, if the threat of exponential
liability surpasses the potential value of the ongoing enterprise it will encourage business
abandonment by rational bad actors.
A more nuanced, but complex scheme of civil penalties, could match the mechanism to
the type of malefactor. For the first violation, or a violation below a certain scale (based on
pounds of mislabeled fish or its nominal dollar value) could trigger a single civil penalty large
enough to incentivize possible relators to instigate the suit, but ultimately not large enough to
threaten the immediate economic viability of most restaurants or retailers. A second or third
violation, or violations over a certain metric of scale (number of incidents or perhaps number of
pounds of fraudulent fish) could open the floodgates. Certainly there is some level of
systemically fraudulent behavior that is of a character so noxious that any just solution should
warrant an existential threat to the survival of the enterprise (or chain/franchise location). That
said, multiple penalty tiers could unnecessarily complicate enforcement, and leave businesses
with a lack of clarity about their potential liability.
A possible flaw in a qui tam scheme to address seafood substitution is that it would
depend on government involvement. Presumably, the State Attorney General could be given the
option, for each suit brought by a relator, to elect to assume control of the claim, or to decline to
pursue it directly. Currently, seafood substitution is not directly covered by any division of the
Office of the Maine Attorney General, but could conceivably be included under the duties of the
Consumer Protection Division.104 However, the statutory damages levied could self-fund the
AG’s involvement in enforcement, assuming some measure of successful discretion in selecting
targets. Further, if the Government’s assumption of responsibility for the case is structured in
the same way as the FFCA, the AG’s office would be able to step in with authority to settle cases
that it felt were marginal. The AG’s opportunistic intervention in the process would also provide
some discretionary protection for restaurants, retailers, and wholesalers accused of fish fraud by
bad faith actors or competitors. Where the AG’s office feels that prosecution should be stayed in
the interests of justice, it would have the power to do so.
2. Class Action

103

A three month discoverable period based on a prima facie showing of fish fraud would open
such a restaurant to roughly $130,000 in possible penalty liability under this scheme.
104 See Office Organization, OFFICE OF THE MAINE ATTORNEY GENERAL,
http://www.maine.gov/ag/about/office_organization.html (last visited Jan 17, 2017).
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Given the systemic entrenchment of fish fraud in the U.S. food supply and consolidation
in the restaurant industry, class action suits seem a ripe tool to organize common cases that seek
to address seafood mislabeling and fraud claims. Unfortunately, Maine has few directly on-point
examples of class action suits used to address consumer fraud. Regardless, it is clear that courts
across other jurisdictions in the United States maintain a high bar for class certification,
particularly in food labeling cases.105 Notwithstanding the critical eye of the courts, conceivable
claims of seafood substitution and mislabeling against restaurants and retailers, resembling those
reported in the press in recent years, 106 could be pursued using Maine’s existing default class
action rules, and the usefulness of class actions as a tool to address this specific issue could be
enhanced through legislative findings in a supporting statute. This would be an expansion of the
type of findings and statements of purpose attached to many pieces of legislation, such as the
Fair Credit Reporting Act, 107 and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. 108
Me. R. Civ. P. 23(a) establishes the prerequisites for certification of a class action
provided:
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on
behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or
defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class. 109
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See also Everest v. Leviton Mfg. Co., 2007 WL 4692839 (Me. Super. Ct. Jan 5, 2007)
(denying class certification of UTPA claim for unjust enrichment for failure to meet ME. R. CIV.
P. 23(b)(1), no danger posed by inconsistent adjudication, and 23(b)(3), lack of predominance or
common questions of law and fact); Jones v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 2014 WL 2702726 (N.D. Cal.
June 13, 2014) (class certification denied due for failure to meet Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3),
commonality/predominance of claims); Werdebaugh v. Blue Diamond Growers, No. 12-CV02724-LHK, 2014 WL 7148923 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2014) (class decertified for failure to meet
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)); Astiana v. Ben & Jerry's Homemade, Inc., 2014 WL 60097 (N.D. Cal.
Jan. 7, 2014) (lack of ascertainable class of purchasers of disputed natural Dutch processed
cocoa).
106

See, e.g., Lou, Bait and Switch, supra note 3; Danna, supra note 3; Abelson & Daley, On the
Menu, supra note 3; Daley & Abelson, Fish Supply Chain Open to Abuse, supra note 3.
15 U.S.C. § 1681(b) (2015) (“It is the purpose of this subchapter to require that consumer
reporting agencies adopt reasonable procedures for meeting the needs of commerce for consumer
credit, personnel, insurance, and other information in a manner which is fair and equitable to the
consumer, with regard to the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization.”).
108 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) (2015) (“It is the purpose of this subchapter to eliminate abusive debt
collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using
abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent
State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses.”).
109 ME. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (2016).
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While “[t]here is no threshold number of class members that automatically satisfies [the
numerosity requirement]” of Rule 23(a)(1), 110 it is arguably under the discretion of the court to
consider the geographic distribution and identifiability of class members as well as the size of the
damages claimed, in regard to the practicality of joinder, a relatively small number of actual
plaintiffs would suffice. 111 Although a small number of plaintiffs may be legally sufficient, if
damages sought are presumed at triple actual damages, the action may still not be economically
viable regardless of the legal sufficiency.112 The barriers posed by Rule 23(a)(2), commonality
of questions of law and fact, and Rule 23(a)(3), typicality of claims and defenses, could also be
lowered through legislative findings that call out to the unifying characterization of seafood
substitution. This could include a statement to the effect that all of the consumer purchasers of
allegedly mislabeled seafood within the statute of limitations from any specific retailer or
restaurant have been injured by the same conduct, and thus share obviously common questions
of law and fact subject to similarly typical claims and defenses.
Such a statement of legislative intent could also assist cases in meeting the certification
prerequisites of Rule 23(a) to meet 23(b)’s requirements to maintain the class action. 113
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Van Meter v. Harvey, 272 F.R.D. 274, 280 (D. Me. 2011).
See Richman, et al v. PCS, et al., No. BCD-WB-CV-10-53, at *3 (Me. Super. Ct. Jul . 12,
2011) (order granting class certification).
112 Assuming an exceedingly generous $100 per class member actual damages from seafood
substitution, and that the class pursues a treble damages award, a seafood substitution class
action seeking $50,000, excluding fees, would require 167 class members. Which is certainly
impractical for joinder. However, a more conservative $25 per class member under an identical
situation would require 667 class members to reach the same economic threshold, which, for the
same nominal damages, may exponentially increase the cost of administering the class.
111

113

ME. R. CIV. P. 23(b) provides:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the
class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual
members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of
conduct for the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which
would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other
members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede
their ability to protect their interests, or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally
applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or
corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the
class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that
a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include:
(A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the
prosecution or defense of separate actions;
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Moreover, contemplating a case based around systemic mislabeling of local specialties, say
substituting langoustine for Maine lobster, and envisioning the minimum required number of
class members for economic viability, it is reasonable to argue that individual adjudication would
be impractical (23(b)(1)(B)). Similarly, one could argue that the common issues of fact and law
lend credence to class action being the most “fair and efficient adjudication of the
controversy.”114
One easily dismissed concern about using consumer class action suits as a primary
enforcement tool is that when launched against out-of-state wholesalers or restaurant
corporations (i.e. the owners of national restaurant chains), the cases would be subject to removal
to federal court under diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332. While a motion to remove could
be a possible tactic for delay, or an attempt to increase the cost of litigation, subjecting the case
to the amount in controversy requirements would lead to remand. 115 Further, obvious bad faith
attempts at removal are subject to sanction or awards of fees.116
Of greater potential concern is that the average restaurant in Maine generates roughly
$450,000 to $500,000 in annual revenue. 117 Therefore, except for larger restaurants, chain
establishments, or restaurants specifically focused on seafood, it is unlikely that restaurants in the
lower fifty percent of the revenue distribution in Maine would have a large enough pool of
defrauded patrons to make up a viable economic class action even if they were engaged in
regular substitution. Given that the goal is to root out systemic fraud at any scale, this limits the
usefulness of class actions as a general purpose enforcement tool.
Moreover, the economic incentive for third party action is diminished by the structural
reality of class action remedies. Assuming a contingent fee arrangement, only the law firm
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy
already commenced by or against members of the class;
(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the
claims in the particular forum;
(D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class
action.
114

ME. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2016) ($75,000 exclusive of interest and costs); § 1332(d)(2)
($5,000,000 for aggregate class action damages); Karofsky v. Abbott Labs., 921 F. Supp. 18, 20
(D. Me. 1996) (remanded on plaintiff’s motion before class certification under ME. R. CIV. P. 23
or FED. R. CIV. P. 23 for failure to meet $50,000 amount in controversy requirement under 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a)), class cert. denied, 1997 WL 34504652, at *15 (Me. Super. Ct. Oct. 16, 1997)
(failure to meet predominance/commonality and management requirements of ME. R. CIV. P.
23(b)(3)).
116 See, e.g., Peltier v. Peltier, 548 F.2d 1083, 1084 (1st Cir. 1977).
117 Figure on average Maine restaurant revenue is extrapolated from: 2014 Maine Tourism
Highlights, VISITMAINE.COM, available at
http://visitmaine.com/assets/downloads/FactSheet2014.pdf (last visited Mar 3, 2016), and Matt
Wolff, Restaurant Growth Index: The Best Places to Open a Restaurant, RESTAURANT BUSINESS
(March 2011), available at
http://www.nielsen.com/content/dam/corporate/us/en/public%20factsheets/restaurant-growthindex.pdf.
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representing the class has an economic incentive large enough to push the case forward, as there
would be no direct participatory role for nonprofit consumer groups, and the award to any
individual consumer would be de minimis. To that end, even if enabled by legislative findings
and statements of purpose, class actions for seafood substitution would still be rarely pursued.
Therefore, while class action is a potential tool for recovery of individual damages, it remains
less viable as a general purpose deterrent to fish fraud, and as such, will be excluded from further
consideration in this proposal.
3. Statutory Damages and Fee Shifting
Rather than relying on actual damages, or some multiple of actual damages, seafood
substitution claims could follow the example of Maine statutes setting minimum levels of
damages or alternative damages calculation to actual damages (or multiple of actual damages)
for specific claims in health care information protection,118 misbehavior by residential mortgage
brokers,119 or the unlawful cutting of trees. 120 Federal law similarly provides a range of statutory
damages for copyright violations. 121
Statutory provisions that allow judicial discretion to award fees to the prevailing party,
more commonly referred to as fee shifting, have been used extensively in Maine (and Federal)
law as a method to strike a balance between the frivolity deterrence of the “British Rule,” and the
rising economic costs that pose a barrier to small but meritorious claims under the “American
Rule.”122 The most prominent federal example of awarding fees to the prevailing party is in civil
rights litigation, but the same theory has been employed in a variety of less weighty contexts
including the Hobby Protection Act. 123 In Maine, fee shifting has been used to assist in
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-810(a) (2016) (“A health-care provider or institution that
intentionally violates this Part is subject to liability to the aggrieved individual for damages of
$500 or actual damages resulting from the violation, whichever is greater, plus reasonable
attorney's fees.”).
119 ME. REV. ANN. STAT. tit. 8-A, § 8-506(6) (2016) (“This subsection applies to any violation of
this section in connection with the origination, brokering or servicing of a residential mortgage
loan. . . (A) Any person who has been found in violation of this section . . . may be liable to the
borrower for . . . (4)(b) . . . statutory damages in the amount of $5,000 per violation.”).
120 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2510(2) (2016) (“The following forfeitures may be adjudged
for each tree over 2 inches in diameter that has been cut or felled: (A) if the tree is no more than
6 inches in diameter, a forfeiture of $25 . . . (F) [i]f the tree is greater than 22 inches in diameter,
a forfeiture of $150.”).
121 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2016) (“The copyright owner may elect, at any time before final
judgment is rendered, to recover, instead of actual damages and profits, an award of statutory
damages for all infringements involved in the action . . . in a sum of not less than $750 or more
than $30,000 as the court considers just.”).
122 See Jonathan Fischbach & Michael Fischbach, Rethinking Optimality in Tort Litigation: The
Promise of Reverse Cost-Shifting, 19 BYU J. PUB. L. 317, 318 (2005) (Under the British Rule the
losing party pays the legal cost for both parties, under the American Rule each party pays their
own legal fees.).
123 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2016) (“[T]he court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party,
other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.”); 15 U.S.C. §
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enforcement of healthcare claims, insurance fraud, illegal gambling, and litigation to enforce
remediation of a bedbug infestation. 124 In the case of seafood substitution the award of
reasonable attorney’s fees serves both as an enabling mechanism to pay for meritorious but
economically insufficient claims, but also serves to increase the penalty for fish fraud in a
manner that encourages the defendant to settle smaller or indefensible claims.125
Setting the level of statutory damage (including fees or not) is an exercise in game
theory—minimizing the repetition of fraudulent seafood substitution by purveyors through the
creation of an outsized deterrent. As discussed in section III(B), Modeling Effective Economic
Deterrence, the goal of this proposal is to wring out any likely profit from systemic fish fraud. In
doing so, the policy must consciously deal with the often conflicting secondary consideration of
providing discretion to prevent abuse, while accelerating the learning curve for industry players
and incentivizing action by consumer or third-party relators. The weight of these factors must be
considered under the specific implementation schedule for the statutory damages and strict
liability provisions. Again, analyzing possible penalties through the 𝜋𝑓 < 𝐷𝑃𝑑 (or 𝜋𝑓 > 𝐷𝑃𝑑 )
formula,126 a mechanical system of civil fines (including attorney’s fees) that increases the
penalty in direct response to the scale of the fraud, seems to be the best approach towards
balancing these factors, promoting third party enforcement, and punishing misbehavior. Specific
levels of penalties will be explored in Section IV.
4. Strict Liability
Strict liability, codified in statute, could help to minimize the use of court resources to
adjudicate any specific incidence of fish fraud, and cut through the endemic finger pointing
between suppliers and restaurants or retailers that act as barriers to establishing if purveyors
knew, or should have known, that they were selling mislabeled fish. Examples among Maine
statutes include defective or unreasonably dangerous goods, 127 and Maine’s “Dog Bite”

2102(a) (2016) (“[T]he court may award the costs of the suit, including reasonable attorneys'
fees.”).
124 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-810 (2016) (Uniform Healthcare Decisions Act); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2164-E (2016) (Maine Insurance Code); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §
1344 (2016) (Regulation of sales representation); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 300-A (2016)
(Illegal bookmaking on harness racing); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.14, § 6021-A (2016)
(Treatment of bedbug infestation).
125 Under a fee shifting regime, 𝑃 will increase rapidly, and in direct correlation, with the time
𝑑
spent litigating the case. Thus, for unambiguous cases of seafood substitution, a rational actor
would seek to settle and limit the penalty.
126 See author’s analysis/application of formula, supra note 88.
127 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 221 (2016) (“One who sells any goods or products in a
defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject
to liability for physical harm thereby caused to a person whom the manufacturer, seller or
supplier might reasonably have expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods, or to his
property, if the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product and it is expected to
and does reach the user or consumer without significant change in the condition in which it is
sold.”).
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statute.128 Unlike these examples, however, there is no reasonable purpose for including the
comparative fault of, or misuse by, the consumer as a defense to seafood substitution. Instead,
the statute must make explicit provisions to allow a defendant in a seafood substitution case to
implead their suppliers as third party defendants. In such situations the restaurant or retailer will
need to offer some proof, likely through invoices or order documentation, that the impleader
made good faith purchases of what they believed to be properly labeled fish and were defrauded
themselves. The goal of such procedure is to undermine the quiet collusion between wholesalers
and retailers/restaurants with a healthy dose of foreseeable adversity and the potential for
mistrust. Moreover, if the Seafood Traceability Program survives the change in administrations
and is implemented, the wholesaler would in turn be able to seek indemnification from the
importer of record for any mislabeled imported fish, provided that species is covered under the
program. Regardless, a wholesaler is far less likely to enable a restaurant to serve mislabeled
fish through doctored or misleading invoices if faced with a credible likelihood of discovery and
potentially disastrous economic consequences. 129
5. Insurance as Quasi-Regulator of Ongoing Behavior
As discussed above, systemic seafood substitution is enabled by the lack of enforcement
and detection resources. While the previous subsections of this comment have addressed ways
to encourage non-governmental/outsourced detection and prosecution for fish fraud, the ongoing
encouragement of compliance, a role frequently played by government employees (code
enforcement, health inspectors, etc.), will also need to be outsourced. This proposal seeks to
create a deterrent to systemic fish fraud, by increasing both the probability of discovery and the
penalty for misbehavior. In essence, this proposal seeks to transfer some of the underlying risk
of purchasing seafood as a consumer towards the commercial purveyors of seafood, creating new
business risks that owners and entrepreneurs will need to address both financially and
operationally.130
Insurers are uniquely situated in the modern economy to address business risk, and to
assist their clientele in mitigating those risks. 131 Insurance, in and of itself, is a financial
management tool that can, through a reasonable premium payment, prevent unavoidable or
routine disasters from causing business failure. In an effort to provide superior service and to
reduce payout expenses, insurers have developed extensive operational expertise in loss
prevention.132 Insurers also act as quasi-regulators through a variety of complimentary tools,
including: (1) differentiating premiums, (2) refusal to insure/exclusions, (3) encouraging safer
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 3961(2) (2016) (“Notwithstanding subsection 1, when a dog
injures a person who is not on the owner's or keeper's premises at the time of the injury, the
owner or keeper of the dog is liable in a civil action to the person injured for the amount of the
damages. Any fault on the part of the person injured may not reduce the damages recovered for
physical injury to that person unless the court determines that the fault of the person injured
exceeded the fault of the dog's keeper or owner.”).
129 See also, e.g., Daley & Abelson, Fish Supply Chain Open to Abuse, supra note 3.
130 See Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How Insurance Reduces
Moral Hazard, 111 MICH. L. REV. 197, 204 (2012).
131 Id.
132 Id. at 204-205.
128
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conduct and implementing private safety codes, and (4) claims administration. 133 In the context
of seafood substitution these tools could help transform the enhanced risk of discovery and
increased penalties into operational policies.
First, differentiated premiums exist in part to prevent moral hazard and adverse selection
on the part of businesses seeking insurance. 134 In a completely opaque insurance market, where
the insurer has no information regarding the behavior of the insured, the price of insurance will
gravitate towards the average possible damage. 135 In such an imperfect market, adverse selection
manifests through risky businesses purchasing higher coverage, seeing the price as a discount of
their true risk; meanwhile careful businesses will drop coverage, as they see the cost of insurance
as unreasonably high. 136 Differentiated premium prices allow the insurer to utilize what they
know about how a specific business operates – leading to the obvious proposition that purveyors
that have been caught substituting seafood are obviously operating at a higher level of risk, have
a higher probability of generating liability, and thus should pay higher premiums for insurance
coverage.
Second, general business liability insurance is a contractual relationship that cannot be
forced upon the insurer. Businesses that have engaged in systemic fish fraud as a business model
may swiftly reach the point where the insurer does not believe they represent a viable risk at any
premium level, leading to rescission for making a material misrepresentation, a refusal to renew,
or a refusal to insure in the first place. 137 Insurers can also insert exclusions into the policy for
criminal activity and/or intentional violations of statutes.138 Thus, business models based on
intentionally deceptive mislabeling will be excluded from insurance coverage, but a purveyor
that makes a good faith mistake, is defrauded by its suppliers, or makes a negligent labeling
error, will not be subject to fatal sanctions.
Third, insurers develop tremendous expertise in business operations and risk mitigation
and can promote best practices in day-to-day operations. Both the refusal to insure and the use
of differentiated premiums can be leveraged in this way, either by refusing to underwrite unless
remedial procedures are implemented, or by offering a premium reduction for specific policy
implementations. 139 For seafood substitution, best practices would suggest that restaurants
maintain a record of invoices documenting the chain of custody behind seafood purchases, and
businesses that demonstrate during onsite audits that they meet record keeping requirements
could be offered a discounted premium. Alternatively, insurers may engage in ex-post
underwriting by denying coverage of claims where the business failed to keep sufficient
purchasing records.140 Further, such best practices could be codified into an industry safety
doctrine.
Finally, claims management and adjustment practices operate like a non-governmental
judiciary, providing investigative resources and the ability to quantify damages before the
133

Id. at 204-215.
See Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated Threat, 113
YALE L.J. 1223, 1223-24 (2004).
135 Id.
136 Id. at 1224.
137 Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 130, at 209.
138 Id. at 215.
139 Id. at 209-12.
140 See id. at 215-16.
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incident escalates to legal action.141 Given that damage awards are often restricted by the
nominal amount of applicable liability coverage, claim management practices provide an
efficient method of sorting quantifiable meritorious claims from the frivolous or nebulous, and
quickly settling disputes in a uniform manner. 142 For purveyors of seafood, having the insurer
step in to manage the claims for substitution could reduce stress on operations, but also allow the
insurer to rationally assess whether or not to settle, take the matter to trial, and/or implead
suppliers to seek indemnification.
D. Evidentiary Burden/Science of Fish Fraud Detection
While the courts will need to develop a functional definition for a prima facie showing of
seafood substitution, there are two obvious possibilities: (1) DNA sequencing, or (2) evidence of
mismatched purchases and menu items, either through business records or employee testimony.
A third possibility, specific to eating escolar, presents itself as well (i.e. documentation of
extreme gastro-intestinal distress). While DNA sequencing offers definitive proof as to what any
given piece of fish actually is, the process is expensive and potentially time consuming.
Moreover, it requires both specialized equipment and the development and use of protocol to
address the sample’s chain of custody. Detecting seafood substitution through invoice checking
is much more practical, but it requires access to the records. Invoice checking works well under
legal regimes enforced by trained government agents, like in Florida or in investigations
conducted by NOAA, but likely cannot be used to open the discovery door under this proposal.
DNA bar coding has recently been rolled out by the FDA, but requires testing equipment
costing upwards of $150,000. 143 Once implemented, the FDA system costs as little as $10 per
sample to test against a database of 250 common species. 144 Several companies have developed
technology that allows DNA testing in as little as forty five minutes to two hours,145 and has
brought down the price for the equipment from hundreds of thousands of dollars to as little as
two thousand for a single species test machine. 146 This trend will likely continue, but until
testing is cheap and easy enough to be conducted from a smartphone while eating out, the
cumbersome reality of DNA testing will prevent widespread adoption by the general public.
141

Id. at 214-15.
See Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 130, at 213-16; Tom Baker & Rick Swedloff,
Regulation by Liability Insurance: From Auto to Lawyers Professional Liability, 60 UCLA L.
REV. 1412, 1421 (2013).
143 Clare Leschin-Hoar, Specious Species: Fight against Seafood Fraud Enlists DNA Testing,
SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (Nov. 10, 2011), https://perma.cc/3SUQ-EPHV.
144 Id.
145 Harness the power of real-time PCR to get fast and accurate DNA-based species
identification, INSTANTLABS, available at: https://perma.cc/SM5N-M75L (last visited Jan. 9,
2017). Instantlabs offers testing for Blue Crab, Atlantic Salmon (farmed), Coho Salmon (wild),
Chinook Salmon (wild), Sockeye Salmon (wild), and U.S. Catfish (coming soon), Horsemeat,
Pork, and can develop custom testing for a target species.
146 Robert Trigaux, USF scientists unveil device to unmask 'fake' grouper, TAMPA B AY TIMES,
Feb. 3 2015, https://perma.cc/7L5T-BPGB; Christine Blank, Faster DNA testing could aid in
seafood fraud, mislabeling in U.S. restaurants, SEAFOODSOURCE (Feb. 12, 2015),
https://perma.cc/R4GP-R35B.
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Consumer advocacy groups, local tourism associations, and health advocacy organizations,
however, can sustain the economic cost of purchasing and operating the new lower priced
equipment or, more likely, can undertake to pay the testing fee to third party laboratories.
Further, provided a strong handling protocol is developed, coalitions of non-profits could operate
national testing centers where consumers could send in preserved samples for testing.
Currently, commercial testing services are available, and while pricing remains opaque,
inquiries yielded DNA species identification tests at a range of $100 to $180 per test depending
on volume.147 While an individual consumer, considering their own damages (the $5-10 they
overpaid for their fish), would find the testing cost to be prohibitive, as part of a larger
consolidated case, or a qui tam action alleging many instances of fish fraud, the cost of testing
could be reduced to a rounding error.
IV. RESTATEMENT OF THE PROPOSAL
To reiterate from section III(A), the primary goal of this proposal is to substantially
reduce or virtually eliminate intentional consumer facing seafood substitution. To be successful
the provisions must (1) enhance the penalties for selling fraudulently mislabeled fish and
organize the cases into large enough judicial units such that recovery can support legal action;
(2) increase the likelihood of discovery of the fraud with minimal or no additional government
enforcement resources (such as field agents, investigators); (3) impose strict liability for selling
mislabeled fish to minimize the additional burden on the judicial system; (4) provide enough
flexibility to differentiate between good faith mistakes and bad faith systemic fraud, such as
allowing retailers and restaurants to seek indemnification from suppliers if that is the source of
the mislabeling; and (5) provide a mechanism to discourage or prevent harassment and nuisance
suits against retailers and restaurants. This section will discuss how the tools discussed above
can be used to craft a legal framework to deter and punish seafood substitution while addressing
the requirements based on the preceding analysis using Maine as an example.
A. Assembling the Framework of the “Seafood Substitution Prevention and Fish Fraud
Deterrence Act”
1. Monetary Deterrent: Statutory Civil Penalties, Fee & Cost Shifting
Assembling a post-regulatory regulatory framework to deter and punish seafood
substitution is a recursive process, but a functional, if arbitrary, point to begin is with the scale
and scope of possible penalties, and how to organize systemic fraud into particular sustainable
cases. As discussed in section II(c) and III(b) the current criminal penalties in Maine ($2,000)
for fraudulent misrepresentation are woefully inadequate to the deterrence task, let alone to
support litigation activity and incentivize detection.148 Given the limits of actual damages ($5$20 per pound of fish) in the case of any individual fraud, the solution appears to be a per
147

E-mail from LeAnn Applewhite, Applied Food Technologies, Inc., to Sage M. Friedman,
Student, University of Maine School of Law (Mar. 22, 2016) (on file with author); e-mail from
Joy Bolster, Account Services, Genetic ID, to Sage M. Friedman, Student, University of Maine
School of Law (Mar. 21, 2016) (on file with author).
148 See author’s analysis and application of formula, supra note 89.
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incident statutory penalty. Per incident is defined as each mislabeled seafood item sold: thus in a
retail setting the sale of ten pounds of salmon mislabeled as wild, when in fact farm raised,
would count as a single incident, as would the sale of one pound of mislabeled salmon; while in
a restaurant setting each entrée or appetizer would count as an individual incident of fraudulent
fish selling. This penalty structure would mechanically increase the penalty for each bad act,
appropriately scaling the fine to the scope of the malfeasance.
While the statutory civil penalty is the largest component of the monetary deterrent (Pd),
this proposal would also allow the court to stray from the traditional “American” model of legal
fees, by awarding reimbursement of reasonable attorney’s fees, court fees, and testing
expenditures, particularly the cost of DNA sequencing or DNA species matching, to a prevailing
plaintiff.149 Thus, Pd is further increased in response to the size of the fraudulent activity and
provides a monetary incentive for rational actors, such as liability insurers, to settle claims
quickly and implement appropriate control systems to prevent future liability. The potential for
enhanced liability through automatically increasing fees could play an even more substantial role
in settling follow-on suits and the impleading of third-party defendants, where the primary
insurers to consumer-facing seafood sellers are seeking indemnification from negligent or
fraudulent suppliers.
In evaluating the mathematical outcome of this scheme, Pd is now defined as the statutory
civil penalty ($150) per incident, plus reasonable attorney’s fees, court fees, and testing costs. 150
The scale of those penalties, however, is determined by the period of time over which the fraud
is considered and over which a prima facie case of fish fraud would enable discovery. These
matters will be discussed in more detail below.
2. Incentivizing and Outsourcing Detection; Addressing Burden of Production
Now that a penalty baseline has been established, the most obvious question is what
portion of the penalty is available to consumers or NGOs to incentivize them to bring a case?
Given the deficiency of class action suits, as discussed in III(C)(2), to provide an easily usable
deterrent or avenue for NGOs or other third parties (including the government) to participate in
enforcement, this proposal looks to the Federal False Claims Act (FFCA)151 and similar qui tam
enforcement systems. Just as with the FFCA, cases could be brought on behalf of the State by
private parties (consumers and NGOs), relators that are an “original source” for accusation of
seafood substitution. 152 Similar to the FFCA, the State of Maine’s Attorney General’s office
would have some period of time, likely 30 or 60 days in which to receive all relevant evidence
and decide whether or not to intervene in the case directly. 153 Under this scheme, the relator (be
they individual or NGO) would receive the lion’s share (fifty-five to seventy-five percent) of the
civil penalties awarded if they were prosecuting the case directly, and a lesser rate when the
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Subject to the procedure and process outlined in ME. R. CIV. P. 54.
Pd = $150(#F) + Attorney’s Fees + Court Fees + Testing Costs, where #F is the number of
incidents of fish fraud under consideration, and fees & costs are totaled for the case as a whole
and subject to award under ME. R. CIV. P. 54 and the enabling statute.
151 31 U.S.C §§ 3729-3733.
152 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B).
153 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2).
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government assumes control of the prosecution (twenty-five to thirty-five percent).154
Additionally, to ensure that government supersession does not break the monetary incentives
towards detection, attorney’s fees and associated costs could still be reimbursed up to some
reasonable cost threshold considered adequate to make a prima facie showing (say $2,500 or
$5,000). Thus, even if the AG’s office then chooses to settle for a lower penalty, the relator who
brings a credible claim would at least cover their costs, and not be left in the cold by government
pragmatism.
This again brings up the question of what would be required for a prima facie showing of
fish fraud. There are two non-exhaustive but obvious answers: (1) DNA testing of samples of
fish sold, and (2) documentary or testimonial proof of a mismatch between the label on fish sold
and that on fish purchased. DNA evidence could be gathered directly by consumers, with
samples taken from fish purchased at restaurants or retailers and sent to testing facilities in
accordance with accepted evidentiary protocols, with expert reports being issued in response.155
Testimonial evidence could consist of restaurant employees providing sworn statements averring
to mislabeling based on personal knowledge of the packaging fish arrives in or the purchasing
habits of the establishment. Documentary evidence could include supplier invoices from the
relevant time period that demonstrate the purchase of a different fish than that appearing to be
sold.156 Any such showing should be enough to bring an initial case for review by the AG, and if
the AG demurs to step in to prosecute directly, could open the doors for formal discovery and
document production under the traditional standards of the court.
Once discovery is enabled there are several possible ways to meet the required
evidentiary burden to proceed past summary judgment: (1) the accused establishment’s inventory
of seafood could be subject to random or comprehensive sampling and DNA testing, providing
conclusive evidence that as of a certain date the fish in inventory was or was not what the
establishment’s management claimed it was; or (2) the business records of the establishment
would be subject to scrutiny including invoices, sales records, and menus. An obvious
disconnect between the fish bought and the fish sold would provide a strong inference that
mislabeled fish was sold over the covered time frame.
3. Strict Liability and Indemnification
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Civil penalties as defined as the per incident penalty of $150 multiplied by the number of
incidents included in the case.
155 This comment leaves the questions of exactly how and why a court promulgates a specific
functional definition of an acceptable evidence handling protocol for private parties to other
capable authors at other more broadly-themed legal journals to discuss in detail. Instead, this
comment assumes that such a protocol is either readily available “off the shelf” or easily
adaptable to this purpose.
156 To function properly this proposal will also require statutory authority to be vested in a
comprehensive database of the legal and scientific names for commonly sold seafood.
Notwithstanding the FDA’s protestations that its database does not have any such authority, FDA
Seafood List, supra note 10, the simplest solution would be to adopt the Seafood List as the
standard for labeling requirements; see Daley & Abelson, Fish Supply Chain Open to Abuse,
supra note 3.
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Again, it is worth reiterating that this proposal’s primary concern is not the punishment of
wrongdoers, although that is a desirable outcome, but to deter ongoing systemic seafood
substitution. To that end, removing the issue of intent from consideration through strict statutory
liability is expeditious in terms of minimizing the court resources required to adjudicate a case,
and in allowing the conduct to fall under traditional business liability insurance unless explicitly
excluded by the insurer. As sophisticated managers of business risk, insurers will most certainly
develop criteria for exclusion/inclusion of coverage for seafood substitution claims, including
minimum record keeping requirements and claim management procedures that could develop
into a private code of conduct, or de facto industry operating procedure. Such quasi-regulatory
activity is a highly desirable secondary goal of this proposal that will contribute to its overall
effectiveness.157
Under this strict liability scheme all that is required to implicate the defendant in the sale
of mislabeled seafood would be clear and convincing evidence that mislabeled seafood was sold
from the defendant’s establishment. Whether that sale was the product of intentional systemic
fraud, or merely a negligent error, no longer requires inquiry, as in either case the purveyor has
failed to meet their duty to the customer. To avoid excessive punishments to those merely
negligent (or easily duped) it is critically important that the seafood purveyor accused of
fraudulent mislabeling be able to seek indemnification from suppliers that were either complicit
in the fraud or the truly responsible party. Existing court rules on third-party practice in Me. R.
Civ. P. 14 should be sufficient to allow this, but it is still recommended that the enabling
legislation should reiterate this intention to provide a clear signal to the courts of that
expectation.
4. Flexibility to Distinguish Between Good Faith Mistakes and Bad Faith Actors; Protection
Against Abusive Litigation
Indemnification, discussed above, provides one important mechanism for differentiating
bad actors from those merely negligent. The FFCA also provides a model for additional safe
guards to prevent abuse, and provide the government and the courts the flexibility to tailor the
solution to the needs of the case. Under the model proposed, after receiving all relevant
evidence, the Maine AG will have the opportunity to take over the prosecution of any case. This
will allow it both to assume command of particularly egregious cases where public policy
dictates aggressive prosecution, but also allows the state to step in and settle marginal cases,
setting a functional floor, under which prosecution is discouraged but corrective action is still
taken.
This capacity to intervene and settle also gives the State AG the ability to protect
business owners from abusive litigation by extinguishing the suit before it proceeds to trial.
Such protection could be further enhanced by adding explicit sanction language for nonmeritorious suits brought in bad faith and authorizing reverse fee shifting to the prevailing
defendant in those extreme cases in line with the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act158 that the
court could utilize at its discretion. Additional flexibility is provided in the structure of the
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See Section III(C)(5), supra.
15 U.S.C. § 1692k (2016) (“On a finding by the court that an action under this section was
brought in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment, the court may award to the defendant
attorney's fees reasonable in relation to the work expended and costs.”).
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penalties–as unintentional negligent mislabeling should be limited in scale or scope to a specific
order of seafood from a supplier, a change to the menu, or some other distinct time period,
limiting the number of incidents under consideration and thus the overall liability. Systemic
fraud, such that it is obviously part of the purveyor’s business plan, will not be so discretely
contained temporally or monetarily, and should therefore open up the defendant to liability
substantial enough that it poses a risk to the ongoing viability of the business.
B. Phase in and Statute of Limitations
This proposal is forward looking, and does not seek to redress wrongful conduct from
before it goes into effect. To that end, the enabling legislation should have an effective date of no
less than six months, but ideally closer to a year, from its date of passage. No claims related to
conduct taking place before the implementation of a comprehensive anti-seafood substitution
framework would be considered, so as to allow the seafood industry and its insurers’ time to
develop appropriate record keeping procedures and to adjust their operations accordingly before
undertaking a new variety of potential liability. Such a cleaning of the slate may be excessively
generous to fraudulent purveyors, given the current statute of limitations on fraud in Maine of six
years from discovery, 159 but seems a practical way to avoid any assertions of due process
violations in the first examples of litigation. Additionally, it puts all restaurants and retailers on
the same footing regarding their potential liability under the new scheme and provides businesses
an opportunity to learn the lessons of the proposal before the penalty becomes an existential
threat to their survival. Regardless, once the anti-substitution framework has been implemented,
a six-year-from-discovery statute of limitation would resume.
V. ENFORCEMENT SCENARIOS
To ground the proposal in reality, this comment now considers several probable, but
admittedly speculative, enforcement scenarios that would be addressed within the first few years
of any enforcement system based on this proposal, hypothetically dubbed the Seafood
Substitution Prevention and Fish Fraud Deterrence Act (“The Act”). These scenarios are not by
any means exhaustive, but illustrate many of the considerations and potential pitfalls involved for
the consumer, the relator, the defendant, the insurers, the AG’s office, and the court. The
primary differentiation between scenarios is the scale of the fraud and the intention of the
purveyor. All of these scenarios are considered at least several years after the passage of the Act,
but all are envisioned as an early test of the new law. Scenarios include: (A) systemic intentional
mislabeling at a large scale tourist restaurant, (B) systemic mislabeling caused by a third party
supplier, (C) negligent mislabeling, and (D) abusive/bad faith claims of mislabeling by an
aggrieved former employee.
A. Systemic Intentional Fraud at Scale
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ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 859 (2016).
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In this scenario, a large restaurant with annual revenues in excess of five million
called for convenience, the Tourist Trap (“the Trap”161), has engaged in systemic fraud
for its entire operating history. Particularly, the Trap offers for sale “Wild Salmon” that is
actually farm-raised, “Native Maine Shrimp” that are actually farm-raised in Thailand, “local
day-boat caught Atlantic Cod” that is actually frozen Pacific cod, and a variety of other white
fishes on special, all of which are actually imported swai (Asian catfish) regardless of what the
staff might call them. The Trap operates as an LLC and is locally owned by a family, all of
whom are involved directly in the Trap’s daily operations. Located in a tourist-centric part of
southern Maine, the Trap serves an average of 400 customers per day.
The action is brought by the Maine Federation of Seafood Consumers (“MFCS”), a nonprofit group formed after the Act’s passage specifically to investigate and pursue claims of
seafood substitution in Maine restaurants. After receiving a tip from a former employee that the
Trap was mislabeling its seafood, the MFSC had ten members dine at the restaurant and take
samples, subject to appropriate handling procedures, that were sent for DNA testing. The testing
results clearly demonstrated mislabeling in all ten cases. The testing costs roughly $1,000. The
MFSC then filed a qui tam complaint alleging ongoing seafood substitution in violation of the
Act. Despite the potential scale of the fraud, and the clear showing of preliminary evidence from
the testing, the AG’s office decided not to intervene because this is the first large scale test of the
Act.
During discovery the lawyers for the MFSC successfully acquire both the purchasing
records of the Trap, and that of its point of sale system, thus accessing a record of virtually every
sale made over the previous three-year period and the corresponding invoices for fish from its
suppliers. While the individual damages to any given consumer are minimal, only a few dollars
per plate, the scale of the mislabeling is quite substantial in terms of customers defrauded–even if
only five-percent of meals served featured one of the fraudulently mislabeled seafood items, that
is still an average of 20 incidents of mislabeling per day of operation. Thus over the course of a
single year the Trap has served 7,280 mislabeled dishes, and under the Act, is liable for
$1,092,000 in penalties. If they are caught after six years of post-Act conduct this egregious, the
penalty liability mechanically rises to six million dollars, plus reasonable attorney’s fees and
costs. However, due to incomplete point-of-sale records and mismanaged purchasing records, at
trial the record provides clear and convincing evidence of only 20,000 incidents of mislabeled
fish. The court calculates the penalty at the lowest level possible, awarding the State and MFSC
$3,000,000 plus fees & costs (20,000 x $150 per incident).
If the Trap has adequate liability insurance it will likely survive its first brush with the
Seafood Substitution Prevention and Fish Fraud Deterrence Act, but even if it does its insurance
premiums will skyrocket. That is if any insurance company is willing to extend the Trap liability
coverage in the future at any possible rate. Regardless, in response to this litigation every
insurance company in Maine will be adjusting its policies to reflect the potential risk from
systemic seafood substitution and take steps to implement purchasing audits for policies where
fish fraud liability could exceed one million dollars. These quasi-regulatory actions would lead
dollars,160
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For reference, average per unit (restaurant) sales for the Olive Garden was $4.5 million
annually in 2015. DARDEN, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT: BACK TO BASICS, at 3 (2015), available at:
https://s2.q4cdn.com/922937207/files/doc_financials/Darden-2015-Annual-Report-Final.pdf.
161 “The Tourist Trap” is a completely fictional creation, and is not meant to represent any actual
restaurant in Maine or elsewhere.
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many other restaurants to clean up their act, and give insurance companies the leverage they need
to insure good behavior or deny coverage to fish fraud claims. The now very well-funded
MFSC, which received fifty to seventy-five percent of the penalty for prosecuting the claim as
well as having had its entire legal costs reimbursed, also has the Trap on its watch list and sends
diners in frequently for follow-up testing.
B. Supplier Shenanigans in Fine Dining
In this scenario the MFSC brings a claim against a high-end seafood restaurant, called for
convenience “Marla’s Oyster Shack.”162 Marla’s advertises itself heavily as a farm-to-table
establishment that sources all of its meat, poultry, and fish from within 150 miles of its location
in Portland, Maine. Marla’s has annual revenues of about $500,000, serving roughly fifty
customers on an average day. Marla’s staple menu items are local Maine oysters, and Maine
lobster rolls. As it turns out, for the past few years Marla’s primary seafood supplier, Fake
Fischer & Co, has been selling them farmed European oysters and shelled lobster meat from
Connecticut, both falsely labeled as local Maine product. Once again, the MFSC has members
dine at Marla’s and sample the food for genetic testing, which provided a clear showing of
mislabeling. The MFSC files a complaint and awaits the AG’s office’s response. In this case,
the AG’s office decides to intervene and assumes control of the prosecution.
The business records of invoices and the point of sale system uncovered during discovery
clearly and convincingly reveal a pattern of systemic fraud, but in this case at the supplier level,
implicating Fake Fischer. Marla’s insurance company steps in to mount a defense, and impleads
Fake Fischer & Co as a third-party defendant seeking indemnification on all counts, as well as
reimbursement of legal fees. The case is resolved by summary judgment, as Fake Fischer & Co.
can offer nothing on the record to dispute the sale of mislabeled seafood by it to Marla’s and then
to the general public. Approximately fifty percent of Marla’s patrons ordered one of the
mislabeled items, thus over its two years of operation approximately 2,600 fraudulent orders of
fish were sold, with corresponding penalties totaling $390,000.
Marla’s, while thoroughly inconvenienced by the lawsuit and having weathered a few
cycles of bad press, emerges whole –recouping its legal fees from Fake Fischer’s insurance
coverage. The MFSC receives twenty-five percent of the penalty for its trouble and is
reimbursed its minimal legal fees and testing costs. It decides to spend that money investigating
the labeling of fish at Fake Fischer & Co.’s other customer restaurants, and in many cases works
directly with the defrauded restaurant owners to mount follow-on cases against their duplicitous
supplier. Fake Fischer’s insurance company refuses to renew their general liability policy, and
while other coverage is available, it is prohibitively expensive. Facing higher operating costs,
ongoing liability from its history of fraudulent mislabeling, and the loss of its most profitable
accounts, Fake Fischer & Co. ceases operation and files Chapter 7 bankruptcy for liquidation of
its minimal assets. Other similar suppliers take notice, and implement appropriate control
systems to avoid a similar fate.
C. Negligent Mislabeling – A.K.A. the Chowder Fish Problem

“Marla’s Oyster Shack” is a completely fictional creation, and is not meant to represent any
actual restaurant in Maine or elsewhere.
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Bob the Fishmonger163 (“Bob’s”) offers a variety of fresh and frozen seafood from Maine
and away in one of Maine’s darling Mid-Coast cities. Among its many offerings is an
assortment of fish scraps for $5.99 a pound. Labeled as “Chowder Fish,” the mix could contain
an assortment of ground fish including cod, haddock, hake, pollack, grouper, flounder, tilapia,
red (or other) snapper, and at least half a dozen other species. When asked about it, the
employees working the counter at Bob’s always say that it is mostly cod and haddock. However,
because the “chowder fish” is made up of scraps and undersized pieces of other fish, Bob has no
records available to offer proof. Further, operating mostly on cash, Bob’s record keeping for the
sale of “chowder fish” is essentially non-existent. Mary, a summertime resident of the
neighborhood and semi-retired attorney, incensed by the low quality of the “chowder fish” her
spouse brought home to make into cioppino,164 sent a sample in for testing that revealed the
scraps to be mostly inexpensive farm-raised tilapia. Mary decides to file a complaint under the
Act, alleging the sale of mislabeled fish.
The AG’s office decides to intervene and settle the case. While Bob’s conduct is clearly
a violation of the Act, the documentary record, even after discovery, is thin and the actual
damages to Mary and other patrons are arguable at best.165 As part of the settlement Bob agrees
to reimburse Mary’s legal fees, which are covered by Bob’s insurance policy. Bob also enters
into a consent agreement with the AG’s office requiring it to label its “Chowder Fish” more
clearly. Patrons to Bob the Fishmonger can now buy “Assorted fish pieces for chowder or
stew*” at $5.99 a pound. Bob, under pressure from his insurer, has upgraded his record keeping
procedures and point of sale system to avoid similar problems in the future.
D. Abusive Litigation
James was a waiter at the Green Lobster in South Portland, Maine. The Green Lobster is
part of a national seafood restaurant chain known for its low-cost lobster dinners.166 James was
fired for taking excessively long breaks and writing in false tip amounts on customer checks.
After he was fired, James files a series of complaints alleging sale of mislabeled seafood at all of
the Green Lobster’s five locations throughout Maine. James attests that the Green Lobster’s
Maine Lobster Tail Dinner actually features spiny lobster (a.k.a. rock lobster or langostas) tails
harvested in Florida. James has no actual proof of these claims, neither genetic testing nor
business records, but in pursuit of a perceived windfall he has filed nonetheless. James’ lawyer
should have investigated the claim enough to believe it was filed in good faith, as required under
Me. R. Civ. P. 11, but that is not what happened, and these frivolous complaints reach the court.
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Bob the Fishmonger is a fictional creation.
Italian Seafood Stew. See, e.g., Giada De Laurentiis, Cioppino, THE FOOD NETWORK,
http://www.foodnetwork.com/recipes/giada-de-laurentiis/cioppino-recipe.html (last visited April
15, 2016).
165 In the author’s opinion $5.99 a pound for tilapia is a reasonably good price as of January
2017.
* This assortment is offered as a special and may or may not include Cod, Haddock, Hake,
Tilapia, Pollock, Flounder, Grouper, Snapper, and an assortment of other fish depending on
availability each day.
166 “The Green Lobster” is obviously modeled on a well-known American chain-restaurant but is
fictional, and is not meant to imply any misbehavior by its real-world inspiration.
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The case proceeds to discovery, only to be revealed as lacking all merit. The court disposes of
the allegations via summary judgment, sanctioning James’ lawyer and James himself jointly by
awarding Green Lobster a reimbursement of reasonable attorney’s fees and discovery costs.
James, being an out of work waiter who was fired for cause, is unable to pay the judgment.
More importantly, lawyers hearing similar complaints from disgruntled former employees in the
future learn to apply a more rigorous investigation to accusations of fish fraud before bringing
suit under the Act.
VI. CONCLUSION
Rampant, systemic, intentional seafood substitution is a threat to public health, to the
environment, to conservation of endangered species, to the economy of communities dependent
on the bounty of the ocean, and to the integrity of the U.S. food supply chain. It is a problem so
large, so massive in scale, that it costs consumers in the United States alone as much as twentyfive billion dollars each year.167 Yet, seafood substitution is a problem that the Federal
government provides less than a hundred trained agents to fight.168 In response to this terminal,
intractable disconnect between the scale of the problem and the resources marshalled to address
it, this comment has proposed a radical solution to shift the economics of the industry against
mislabeling.
As the narratives of possible enforcement scenarios above demonstrate, this scheme
could lead to penalties of a magnitude that cast doubt on the survival of fraudulent purveyors.
Indeed, such a solution may seem outsized when measured against the circumstances of any
individual example of mislabeling, but it is a draconian solution tailored to a systemic problem
that existing laws and regulation have been unable to curtail. The goal is deterrence of obviously
fraudulent conduct by the purveyors of seafood, who have strayed outside of legal and ethical
behavior because of the profit motive, and whose bad behavior has been enabled by lax
enforcement. This is a radical solution offered because there seems to be no hope that the simple
solutions, such as hiring more trained regulators and inspectors, the interim solutions, such as the
SAFE Seafood Act, or the comprehensive solutions, such as implementing and funding all the
recommendations of the Presidential Task Force on Combating IUU Fishing and Seafood Fraud,
can be enacted in the dysfunctional environment of modern American politics.
In an ideal world this proposal, if implemented, would be enforced no more than handful
of times – the idea being that by bringing the full might of the penalty down on a few of the most
egregiously bad actors, likely ending their businesses, the rest of the industry will take notice and
rationally change their behavior to reflect the new economics of fish fraud. If business operators
fail to notice and change their behavior, the insurance industry will step in to protect its own
interests by requiring proof of better behavior in order to maintain liability coverage. That said,
for all the fearsome scale of the potential penalties, this proposal offers a state-based solution,
crafted from tested legal tools, which should limit any concern about unforeseen consequences
and market disruption.
In closing, please note that this proposal is not offered as a comprehensive or bestpractices solution, but as a counterpoint to the inaction of the status quo. It is an effort to stop
floundering around on seafood substitution and finally align the interests of consumers, retailers
167
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and restaurants against the regulatory and marketing failures that continue to allow widespread
mislabeling and outright fraud. By borrowing the qui tam structure and checks of the Federal
False Claims Act, fee shifting from civil rights law, and harnessing the quasi-regulatory power of
the market for business liability insurance, this proposal crafts a deterrent large enough to shift
monetary incentives; to realign the structure of the consumer facing seafood industry against
substitution through the use of a scalable, flexible deterrent and incentives to promote third-party
detection. These measures would not only increase the independent probability of detection and
the monetary penalty for being caught, but also link the two variables in a virtuous cycle where
higher penalties attract more scrutiny, which in turn results in more severe consequences for bad
behavior. This approach would drive the level of illicit profits required to support systemic fraud
to increasingly unsustainable heights, and by wringing out the fraudulent profits accomplish the
goal of reducing consumer facing seafood substitution. 169
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As D and Pd rise, 𝜋f must also rise or a rational fraudster would discontinue mislabeling
because the risk of the consequences would exceed the expected value of the profits. Further,
under this proposal Pd increases with every fraudulent act, making the only way to cap liability to
cease the behavior. See 𝜋𝑓 < 𝐷𝑃𝑑 and 𝜋𝑓 > 𝐷𝑃𝑑 analysis and application, supra note 89.
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